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IN TROD UC TION

The aim of this study is to examine the background
and concepts of the international convention that ruling
the conduct of liner conferences which has entered into
force in October,1983. But, for many countries including
mine, the Code is still an unfamiliar instrument. So, this
study, first.intended to eliminate suspicions on what the
Code really is and how we can make use of it,
Thailand has not ratified this convention, Threre are
many different views regarding whether we should have rati
fied it, Disputes are on what are the impacts to the nation
al economy if the Code is aoplied and some doubts whether
it can really work.
This study is devided into 3 parts. Part one deals
with conference system. It consists of A chapters. Chapter
I will explain how the situation developed that brought
liners to meet and the first conference come to exist. Con
ferences were found to be amixture of good and bad, A gues—
tion has been raised: how should conferences be regulated?
Chapter II says about brief history of public investigations
and government controls over the system. Two different views
of U.K, and U.S, Governments toward conferences are comoared.
Conferences have an international characteristic. The dif
ference in government attitudes toward the same body, con
ferences, might arise disputes. A thought which suggests
international accepted rules for conferences appeared.
Chapterlll deals with the question how should conference
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be regulated. Some economic aspects of liner shipping that
B.>5plain why competition solution are not workable in this
industry. Some views on 'open' 'closed'conference and ra
tionalization. Chapter lU is concerned with present organi
sation

and practices of conferences. Then part two headed

"The UN Code of Conduct for Liner Conference" consists of
2 chapters. Chapter V deals with developments that led to
the existence of UN Code; chapter VI deals with some key
issues regarding its implementation. Part three: develop-=!
««

ment of national fleets with the Code consists of 3 chapters.
Chapter VII the current situation of shipping industry in
Thailand. Chapter VIII is about liner shipping and the par
ticipation of Thai vessels in conferences. The last chapter,
chapter IX is suggestion on the application of the- Code in
Thai 1 and.
This subject is an exceptionally large one. It has
taken a lot of my time to read and to understand before
writing it. So, with this limit of time, this study has .„
missed many points which I first intended to include.
It is my hope that it will prove to be a useful guide
for the future

PART

ONE

CONFERENCE SYSTEM

a

5.

CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND TO CONFERENCE SYSTEM,

Shipping.conferences are among the earliest cartels
in international tradel"*^hey are agreements organised by
shipping lines operating on the same route/s or between the
same range of ports. The basic objectives of a conference
are to control competition between the members of the con
ference and to eliminate outside competition on the route/s,
<«

The competition between the members of the conference is
controlled by all the members agreeing to charge uniform
rates. To effectively enforce the agreement on rates the
members also agree to follow the same rules andreculations
for calculating freight charges, oayment of freight, accep
table packaging for different commodities, determine the
standard percentage of brokerage commissions to be paid by
members and the circumstances under which these may be paid.
To further limit competition between the member lines,
conference agreements may allocate definite ports of call
to different members or restrict the .rrambers of sailings of
each members. The competition for cargo between the member
lines is further restricted in some cases by forming one or
more pools between the member lines which provide for pool
ing together cargo and/or freight revenue of all the members
of the pool and then periodically sharing it according to
agreed percentages.
To fight competition from non-conference lines,

6

conferences have evolved certain arrangements whereby they
try to secure continued and exclusive patronage of the

■>

shippers to the conference lines. These are either in the
form of positive inducements to shippers to confine their
shipments exclusively to the members of the conference or
a penalty to shippers who use a casual non-conference ship
ping opportunity. These are called ” loyalty arrangements ”
The nature of their organization varies considerably,
depending on the market structure of the trade route^the
jurisdictions of the countries whose trade they serve.
There is no typical conference. Some have been conferences
quite literally-informal oral conferences-but many have
employed written agreements establishing a permanent body
with a chairman or secretary»and containing carefulLy des
cribed rights-, and obligations of the conference membership.
Penalties for violations of the agreement are sometimes
stipulated and in such cases the posting of casti or a ful
filment bond is usually required. There might be some

:~

arrangements to refer disputes to arbitration included in
the agreement.
Shipping conferences have been in existence for some
1i2S years now and today roughly 350 of them are operating
throughout the world with individual membership ranging
from two to as many as 40 separate lines.
The conference system has been found to be

^Inixture

of bad and good. As soon as the first conference was founded,
criticism. arisecJ, The basic arguments in favor of conferences

0
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are that they provide regular,reliable service with stable
raates. The main arguments against

them are abuse of monor*

poly power with misallocation of resources,excess capacity
with unnecessarily high freight rates, and,particularly,
price discrimination. There have been many studies of the
system,both by official agencies and academicians. Some
findings are for the system,others against. These difference
in concepts upon the system could be found for quite a long
time in Governments'policy of different countries. Should
bonferencestie let free to restrict competition and
enjoy:

monopoly power ? Should Government^apply the concept

of counter-balance conference \l» shippers or shippers'council
and let the industry be self regulated and make the best
benefit from rationalization? Or,Should it be under close
government's control ? But the nature of conferences is ,
international. If one country imposes control over them uni
laterally^ It would likely arise conflict. This factorsupports the idea of having an international convention on
the control over liner conference conduct.
/th
In the mid of 19^century,several trends or develop
ments joined and as a result there evolved shipping industry
much as it is known and practiced today. One such trend or
development was the rapid spread of the Industrial Revolution
with its increasing need for foreign (overseas) markets and
sources of raw materials. Another was the change from vessels
propelled by wind and constructed of wood to vessels propelled
by a screw or propeller powered by steam and constructed of

<»
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iron a t steel. Constructing vessels of iron and steel made
possible larger vessels with larger cargo-carrying capacities.
Prior to that time,most vessels had been owned or operated
by traders or trading companies that owned the cargo being
transported(with the cargo being transported from the manu
facturing or industrialized countries to be sold at its des
tination and with the cargoes to be brought back on such;
vessels purchased at or near the places where the return
voyage commenced). The ability to steam continuously at known
Mt

speeds,without regard to the wind,enabled operators, if
desired, to set and follow more certain routes and schedules
and arrival and departure times to and from various ports
on the routes. With the larger vessels, operators oftentimes
had space available to carry cargo other than that which
they

carried for themselves. With this additional space

and with more or less certedn schedules of sailing and routes,
space could be offered to others who had cargo to be tran
sported to or from the scheduled routes and ports, many
products became transportable overseas for the first time
and ’• shared " ocean transport provide-tJ new trading oppor
tunities for a vast number

of small and medium sized shippers.

As the market for steamship service rapidly grew,
there developed a recognizable split in vessel services
between tramp and liner shipping. Tramp shipping evolved
rather quickly into a service involving full shipload lots
and continued to be controlled by the relatively unrestricted
play of market forces. In contrast, liner shipping focused

9

on the growing demand for the transport of general caxgo
which tended to move in relatively small lots between a
variety of destinations and among numerous shippers and con
signees, Liner vessels were thus deployed over fixed geo
graphic routes,attempting to maintain regular times of arrival
and departure. Rather than relying on a completely free market
determination of transportation rates,liner companies soon
began publishing fixed rate sheets (or tariffs) which quoted
prices that not only reflected the perceived demand for, and
K

the cost of,the transportation service but also varied de
pending on the value and stowing characteristics of each
type of cargo.
The steamship revolution,with its faster and larger
vessels,q u i ckly generated over-capacity in the shipping
market-place. A sailboat took an average of BO to B5 days
to get from the I’.K, to Australia.

This voyage u;e.5 shcrtenc-cJ

by about 1F rJays bctmeen 1873 and 1897 with the use of steam
ships, The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 also coincided
with this period and led to a substantial reckiction of
duration of the voyages from Europe to India and the Far
East, The same amount of cargo that required,at the begin
ning of the 19th century,four sailboats could be carried on
one steamship for half the time by the end of the century.
The cargo movement did not keep pace with the fleets'ex
pansion, Rate wars between competing liner companies led to
general rate instability and to the virtual collapse of the
liner shipping business.

9
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The

surviving liner firms,seeing the u/isdom of joint

arrangements,begun to coordinate tonnage and sailings and to
maintain rate levels, thereby lowering the risk of the busi
ness, Controlling competition amongst themselves and creating
a united front to fight, other carriers were the initial steps
taken by the shipowners. As a result,the first liner confe
rence,the U,K,-Calcutta Conference,was founded by seven
British liner companies in 1875 as the first succesful shipping

^
(2 )
conference,

„

The early years of conference evolution were marred
by considerable resistance from major shipper who had grown
accustomed to quantity rebates and flexible rates. Early
conference rules attemped to apply a principle of equal treat
ment of shippers by banning preferantial rates and rebates.
Big shippers looked for other alternatives. They turned to
independent carriers who agreed to carry their cargo for
lower rates. The conference,in order not to lose good,regular
customers,agreed to give discount in exchange of loyalty from
the shippers to ship their cargo exclusively on conference
(3 )
vessels, Defered rebates concept was introduced, Thus,th&
first loyalty agreement waS signed in 1877, Since then, con
ference has grown very quickly both in number and pnwer.
As conferences, having cartel-like characteristic
are able to play to a certain extent role in determination
on freight level. Sometimes, they are believed or charged
by shippers to play discrimination. Apart from rebates
granted to shippers in exchange for the exclusive support.

«»
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other defences agaist the activities of non-conference
lines include rate-cutting on specific parcels or certain
commodities, and the berthing of additional

vessels,

namely fighting ships, to blanket the outsider sailings.
Conferences have, over the years, fought Ijong and hard to
protect their own spheres of interest, the intruder sometimes
being a fellow member of an adjacent conference seeking to
enlarge his field of operations, Many of these battles,
especially those with the true speculative operator,, have
ended with the outsider being driven from the trade, or
perhaps with drawing when easier pickings seemed to be had
elsewhere,
In the late 19D0's, there were quite a number of
mergers and amalgamations of shipowners due to avoiding
rate war.that facilitated the formation of tighter conferen
ces in the early twentieth century. This concatination of
events naturally aroused suspicions concerning the shipping
industry, suspicions which gained support from allegations
of discrimination and other monopolistic practices made
(4)
from time to time by shippers.
There have been many official national inquiries into
the working of the system. The earliest was in 1909.(Royal
Commission on Shipping Rings) in the U,K, closely followed
by one in the USA in 1913 - 14 (Alexander Committee), The
most recent inquiry was in the U,K, where the Committee of
Inquiry into Shipping (Rochdale Committee) reported in 1970,
(55)
All reports accepted the necessity of liner conferences,.

&
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND OF THE REGULATION OF CONFERENCES

In 1906,the British Government started a thorough
investigation of the subject and the United States Govern
ment in 1912 began a comprehensive study of the situation
in American commerce,The Royal Commission on Shipping Rings
reported .to

his Britannic Flajesty in 1909,and the Alexander

Committee,which was charged by the Committee on Merchant
ic

Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives of the
Congress of the United States to investigate all types of
shipping combinations,issued their report in 1914,The consen
sus of these reportswas that shipping conferences were neces
sary to assure stability of rates,regularity of service, and
improved facilities;but that these organizations contained
the inherent vice of monopoly power,
As the name indicates,Conferenes are organized groups
made up- of independent and competing shipping lines. Conferences
are not registered companies and have no private legal status.
The vast majority of shipping conferences are international
in scope with member companies operating under different
national flags. Most conferences limit their activities to a
pair of particular geographical regions, known as a "trade",
which usually covers the trade between two or more countries.
Some operate in one direction only but a few are round-voyage
conferences. Shipping companies may belong to one or several
conferences and, although liner companies tend to be either

a
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conference-prone or independent,there are a number of liner
firms that operate as conference members in certain trades
as independents,0 r outside the conference, in othersf"^^
The first to conduct a public inquiry into the conference
system were the British, In 1906, the Royal Commission on
Shipping Rings was appointed. In 1909, after three years of
thorough investigations, the commission came out with its
report.The Commission concluded,in its majority decision,
that the conference system,as a whole,does not operate to the
««

detriment of the British economy, A system of checks and balances
is inherent in the conference itself,ie.,the internal com
petition among the member lines. Outside competition from
independent carriers and the common actions taken by shippers
secure the phenomenon from abusing its powers in an unreason
able manner. The majority did not consider legislation as a
solution to control the powers of the conferences .The Commission
recommended the. formation of shippers^ organizations for the
purpose of negotiating with conferences as collective represen
tatives of the users of conferences services. The majority
further recommend that the Board of Trade should keep conference
practices under review by demanding the filing of conference
agreements with it and the publication of their tariffs. The
minority group demanded more stern action by the authorities
to

avoid monopoly abuses. The Commission^ majority report

recognized the advantages of the conference system,!.e, the
stability of rates and the regularity of service. The majority
concluded that the advantages of the conferences are substan-

0
1^.

tially dependent on the tying arrangments, the deferred rebates,
or some other system which is equally as effective. The only
method the majbrity saw as necessary to secure the fairness
of these arrangements was the depositing of the agreements
with the Board of Trade. Even the minority did not recommend
any legislation which might prohibit or restrict tying devices.
The minority concluded that the conference systemdoes not
necessary supply regular and adequate service, and the stable
rate is not such a big advantage because it is usually higher
«c

than the competitive.rates. However,the minority opinion did
not suggest the abolishing of the conference system. The recom
mendations of the Royal Commission were not implemented in
England,probably because of the strong position the shipowners
held in that maritime nation.
In the U.S, in 1912, a feu years after UK investigation
a Congressional Committee the Hause of Representatives Mer
chant Marine and Fisheries Committee,under the chairmanship
of Representative Joshua Alexander,undertook the task of
inquiring into the modes and prectices of shipping conferences.
The Alexander Committee (named after its chairman) faced a
(9)
double problem.
First,the U.S, was not a maritime power;and second,
the existence of the antitrust laws,which state that every
contract,combination in the form of trust or otherwise,or
CQj^spiracyin restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states,or with foreign nations,is declared to be illegal.
The Committee reviewed the advantages and disadvantages

of conference system,concluding that the system should be
maintained,but under closer government regulation.
The Committee did not favour the prohibition of con
ferences because it felt that such an action would involve
a 'whole sale disturbance'of the conditions that existed
in the shipping industry.lt was also concluded that pro
hibition would deprive shippers of the advantages cited were;^
- greater regularity and frequency of service,
- stability and uniformity of rates,
««

- economy in the cost of service,
- better distribution of sailings,
- maintenance of US and European rates to foreign markets
on a parity,and
- equal treatment of shippers through the elimination
of secret arrangements and underhanded methods of
discrimination.
The disadvantages cited by the Committee included:- the elimination of competition through the use of
fighting ships and unlimited rate cutting,
- Bxcessiv/e and arbitrary rates,
- complete conference

-domination of shippers,

- conference indifference to the landing of freight in
proper condition,
- secrecy of agreements and conferences,
- discriminatory rates between large and small shippers,
- the state of continual

dependence that shippers were

placed in as a result of the deferred rebate.

16.

The committee felt that termination of conference
arrangements would result in either rate wars or consolidation
through common ownership. Neither alternative was seen as *
prefsEcahle to the conference system.
In light of the advantages and disadvantages of the
conference system,the Committee suggested that the Interstate
Commerce Commission shall have jurisdiction over the activities
of the shipping conferences operating in the foreign commerce
of the U,S, The conference should file their agreements with
ICC that will have the authority to cancel,modify,or approve
those agreements. The criterion of disapproval should be
based upon whether or not the agreements are detrimental to
U,5,commerce. The Alexander Committee also recommended that
tariffs should be published; that deferred rebates and fighting
ship should be outlawed; that the ICC should have..the authority
to investigate,on its own initiative,matters concerning these
subjects;and that if needed, the ICC could order the dis
banding of a conference,^
By not being allowed to cooperate, the shipping compa
nies will engage in constant rate wars. As mergers are restricted
in the U,S,,shipping companies will rise and fall by the dozen,
Li.S, economy,in general,and the American shipowners and ship
pers, inparticular, will be hurt. Therefore,the Committee
recommended to let the conferences operate and to exempt them
from the antitrust laws. As a result of the Committee s
recommendations,in September of 1916,the Shipping Act was
passed in the U,S,Congress, The Shipping Act encompasses the

17.

major recommendations of the Alexander Report and remains
today,as amended, the guiding legislations for ocean freight
regulation. The Act provided for acceptance ofthe conference
system with government supervision, but rather than investing
the regulatory power in the ICC, Congress created the U.S.
Shipping Board, a predecessor of the Federal Maritime Com—
(14)'
mission.'
The U.K.and all other major European maritime nations
have a commonview,adopted a laissez-faire attitude toward
liner conference operations. While,in U.S, it was believed
that even though conference were necessary but subject to
certain government.controls. These different attitudes would
cause difficulties because the liner shipping including con
ference has a characteristic of an international activ-ity
over which one nation imposes control would be considered as
unilateral actions. Conflicts would be likely tO-OGcur,

(!^)

IMevertheless,for over 40 years following enactment of the
Shipping Act, there was no relatively restrained conference
control over liner trades. Despite U.S, maritime law and
regulatory tradition,conferences expanded their control over
services and rates. Outside the U.S, they acted independently
of government regulation. Even in the U.S.trades the system
of deferred rebates flourished,despite its illegality.
In 1958 the U.S, Supreme Court handed down its decision
in the Isbrandtsen case. After over a decade of questioning
the legality of dual-rate contracts used by conferences,the
Supreme Court found that such contracts violated section 14

a
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of the Shipping Act when employed as ” predatory devices ”
are charged a lower freight rate than non-signatories. This
system of immediate rebates had been used in place^' of the
deferred rebate,which was outlawed in the U.S,trades by the
Shipping Act,^^^^
As a result of the Isbrandsen decision,there was
concern,- that the effective operation of the conference
system would be hampered. Consequently,Congress enacted
legislation suspending the effect of the Isbrandsen decision
for two years, during-which time the dual-rate system would
be carefully scrutinized so that an " ultimate solution to
the problem could be finally and fully resolved ” ,
Congressional concern resulted in two years of hearings on
the ocean freight industry
Immeadiately following the Isbrandtsen case,the House
merchat f'larine and Fisheries Committee, under the chairmanship
I

of■Herbert C.Boner,conducted an extensive study of steamship
conferences and dual-rate contracts. Also in 1959,the "Anti
trust " Subcommittee of the Hbuse Judiciary Committee chaired
by Emanuel Cellar, began an investigation of monopoly problems
in the ocean freight industry. The Bonner Committee made
extensive use of the Celler Subcommittee's findings in deve(18)
loping its recommendations.
The findings of the Bonner Committee resulted in the
1961 enactment of Public Law 87-3AB which authorized the use
of dual-rate contracts,while providing additional safeguards
to shippers. This was the first major piece of legislation

«»
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amending the regulatory provisions of the Shipping Act since
1916,The Committee had ascertained that the traditional
principles of anti-trust could not be applied to the ocean
freight industry.lt decided that

it should encourage

the continued maintenance of effective conferences and that,
within safeguards,it should authorize and direct the FMC
to approve.exclusive patronage arrangements without which
conferences might well become ineffective,The Committee had
clearly intended that a strong conference system be ensured
through the dual-rate contract,'fl9)'
Following enactment of Public Law 87-346, the Celler
Report was published in 1962,This report reflected the sub
committee's view that the national shipping policy as embo
died in the Shipping Act of 1916 was fundamentally sound;
however,the enforcement of the statutes regulating the indus
try had been deficient,The Subcommittee found the conference
system had changed very little since the Alexander Report.
There continued to be flagrant abuses of the conference's
privileges,while its strengths increased,Among the abuses
found..by_the.Celler Subcommittee were
- secret rate agreement,
- unapproved divisions of traffic and territories,
- secret rebates,
- conference admission restrictions,and
- discriminatory treatment of shippers.
The Subcommittee noted with respect to conferences,that
where anti-trust immunity has been so widely abused it would

9
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have been consistent with Congressional policy to with
draw it,However,the Subcommittee cited three basic reasons
for not recommending withdrawal of anti-trust immunity:-

existing institutional structures of long and histo
rical standing should not be set aside except as a last
resort".

-

the conference system is an international one that
could not be eliminated and might not be improved merely
by withdrawel of lines, foreign as well as American-joperating in the foreign commerce of the United States",

-

outright elimination of the conference system in
U,S, foreign commerce without enactment of substantial
safeguards and authorization of much increased subsidies
might well result.in inflicting severe hardship upon our
American merchant marine and in creating substantial
rate instability presently undesired by American shippers".
The Seller Subcommittee made it abundantly clear that

it did not endorse the manner in which conferences had been
conducting their ooerations,The Subcommittee indicated that
it was necessary'to revise methods for controlling the opera
tions of conferences and for prohibiting abuses which violate
conference agreements,to deter violations of the law,to safe
guard shippers from unreasonably high conference rates, to pro
tect nations and ports from unjustified discrimination,and
(20)

to leave the way free for independents to enter the trades'.
The legislative revisions to the Commission's respon
sibilities that were enacted into law in 1961 included the

®
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addition of section 18(b) which required all carriers in
the foreign trade to file with the Commission their tariff
rates,classification,rules and regulations and any changes
thereto.This legislative change initiated the tariff filing
requirement that is currently the subject of much debate.
It is interesting to note that the Congressional and Execu
tive decisions to require that the Commission ensure that ,
the carrier's tariffs contain a certain amount of integrity
was based on years of investigations which revealeda litany
or
of abuses and discriminatory behaviour.
The increased attention given to shipping regulation
in the late 1950s and early 1960s resulted in an increase in
the Commission's responsibilities,apparently because Congress
had decided that the regulation of liner shipping had not
been rigorous enough to prevent abuses of power,During this
same time period,a series of decisions by the courts reduced
the scope of anti-trust immunity that the shipping companies
had thought they ■possessed.
These court decisions have become part of the shipping
industry lexicon and the mere mention of Svenska,Carnation
and Sabre can send chills up the spine of shipping executives.
As a result of the Svenska decision,the Commission decided
that activities which represented serious anti-trust intru
sions required a more substantial anti-trust-type justifi
cation before they could be approved,The net result of the
Carnation and Sabre decisions was that carriers are no
longer certain as to whether agreements are vested with total

22.

anti-trust immunity.To a large degree the stricter condi
tions placed upon conference behaviour reflect the Judiciary
Committee's view that conferences should be tolerated but
not encouraged.

(2 1 )

This development of US legislation gave rise to serious
problems of jurisdiction as one country unilaterally attempted
to impose its own theories and laws to this international
caracteristic liner industry,As the Rochdale Committee in
U,K, dicussed this problem in its report that "the FPOC duties
have brought it into direct dispute with the government of
other countries;they have strongly disputed its alleged
powers of jurisdiction in requiring alteration..'of contracts
concluded outside the U,S,A,;perhaps not even with US entities,
and the provision of documentary evidence,particularly of a
financial nature,They have also objected to the way in
which unilateral US decisions could effect their national
economic interests,even where no jurisdictional issue were
involved.

(■22 )

In 1964,the UK Government took powers enabling it to
forbid UK companies to meet certain of the demands of the
me.The sanctions operating for the m C are fines under
the Shipping Acts and,perhaps of greater consequence,triple
damages under the anti-trust Act,"
The report further mentioned that "detailed regulations
imposed by the Commission are said to have directly damaged
UK interests by making heavy demands on management's time
and by reducing flexibility in the provision of shipping

0
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services.
It has also been claimed the requirement that
conferences should be'open' has led to very substantial
over-tonnaging of the North Atlantic routes with the USA,
As a result of the present system,cargo liners on these
routes have been sailing,on average over a period of
years,nearly two-thirds empty and are currently said to
be sailing half-empty;freight rates are high and rising,.,
V

2A.

CHAPTER III
THE ECONOIVIIC STRUCTURE OF THE LINER INDUSTRY WHICH LEADS

■

TO DESTRUCTIVE COMPETITION-,

General structural conditions required for perfect
comoEtition to be workable. Those economic attributes which
mpst be present to ensure comformance with the microeconomic
textbook model of

pure competition are :
*€

- There must be ease of entry and exit from the industry.
Firms must be able to respond to market forces (profits)
in their decisions to enter or exit an industry,
- The serv/ice offered by vessel operators must be simi
lar or homogeneous,
- There must be a large number of firms in each market.
The greater the number of firms, the less impact any
one carrier can have on market price.
The most valid economic reason for concluding that
competitionr is not workable in the liner industry is that
condition number one -free entry and exit- is not fulfilled.
Ocean shipping today is an exceedingly capital intensive
industry. Even though, liner operations are, on the average,
significantly more expensive than other

forms of oceaEn

transport. The reasons are obvious. Liner vessels are more
costly to build and operate than, most other cargo ships.
Liner operations rec^uire an expensive infrasturcture of
terminals, reservation and communication, systems, networks
of cargo agents, etc. Ships built to serve as liners are

&
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normally designed to be fit in the intended trades accor
ding not only to the nature of the commodities transpnrted
(whether they can be containerized or not) but also to port
infrastructure and the capabilities of the inland transport
systems in the countries served. Entering liner shipping
means a long term investment. All these conditions make a
move of a liner from one trade to another difficult.
Some other factors regarding the economic structure
of the liner industry itself not allowed competitive*solu
tion to be workable,:The cost structure of the liner indus
try is one of the key factors in understanding why unfettered
competition is unworkable.
The ocean liner industry does notqiaalify as a natural
monopoly -such as public utility- because economies of scale
are not great enough to lead to a monopoly solution. Internal
long run costs do not demonstrate a tendency to decline such
that one firm could supply the entire market before all
economies of scale are exhausted.

High Ratio of Fixed and Constant Costs,
While the capital intensity is not High enough to
lead to the natural monopoly solution in the liner indus
try, capital costs and, therefore, fixed costs are becoming
a larger proportion of total costs. In addition, most other
costs are constant in the short run produces that a short
run average cost declines rapidly as output (capacity
utilization) is expanded.
The reason that liner operators have such a large

o
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proportion of their costs which are constant is because of
the nature of the common carrier service these o-perators
offer. Liner operators offer a schedule of services and rates
which are fixed in the short run. Liner operators, therefore,
are susceptible to the risks inherent in a fluctuating market
for their services.
Table
Relationship between load factor and average
cost per container
Load Factor

..
25

Average Cost Per Container $2228

50
$12A0

70

85

S958

$843

100
$747

Source : "Market Environment and Container System Producti
vity," National Maritime Research Center, Kings
Point, New York, 1974,
Having a larc^e portion of costs being constant, ave
rage and marginal cost per unit of output decline rapidly
results in ;
- forcing carriers to place a high premium on full uti
lization since few costs are soared if a vessel is
50^ rather than 100^ full,
- A carrier that realized a load factor of 50^ would
have to charge a shipper |1240 per container ( see
table) to break even, i,e,, cover expenses. If this
same carrier could achieve a load factor of 100^, a
charge of $747 per container would be sufficient,
- Liner operators incline to use marginal cost pricing,
if necessary, to obtain cargo.
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Since variable or marginal costs account for only
around 20 percent of total costs, marginal -cost pricing must
be destructive.

Elasticity of Demand
It is commonly agreed that the demand for ocean tran
sportation is inelastic. Thus, a reduction in rates of 10 per
cent, for example, will lead to a less than 10 percent increase
in quantity shipped, and total revenue will decline rather
than increase. The demand for liner transportation services
is a derived demand. Therefore, to calculate the price elas
ticity of demand, for transportation, one must multiply the
ratio of the freight rate to the value of the commodity by
the elasticities of demand and supply for the commodity.
The conclusion that demand for transportation is in
elastic should not be confused with the notion of cross elas
ticity, That is, if one carrier reduced its rates below the
rest, and offered a similar service, that individual carrier
would experience a surge in demand and his demand schedule
would appear highly elastic. The rest of the group which was
experiencing a loss in its marketshare, would have no choice
and in the classic oligopolistic reaction, they would match
the reduption possibly precipitating a rate war.
ffll above factors and the circumstance that rapid
exit from the industry is not possible ultimately results in
a breakdown of competitive solution,
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Houj should liner shipping be regulated 7
Let

refer back to the Rochdale's report. The report

concludes that " the 'open 'conference appears least likely
to serve the interests of shippers. It is also least likely
to serve that of shipowner "...'closed 'conferences without
rationalised sailing schedules may have attractions for ship
owners and may, in some cases, provide a better service for
shippers than would be available in the absence of restric
tions," and " The ' closed'conference with fully rati'onalised
sailings appears to us most likely to serve the best interests
of both shippers and shipowners,"
UNCTAD also suggested that a government that seeks to
reduce the level of freight rates has basically two options.
It can either encourage competition by non-conference liner
operators in the expectation that they will undercut confe
rence rates, or it can press shipowners and shippers to ra
tionalize and so aim to reduce rates by reducing the overall
cost of service. The principles underlying•these alternatives
are fundamentally different: increased competition by nonconference liner services will make the overall liner trade
less rational and may make it more costly (by increasing
over-tonnaging,duplication of sailings,and fragmentation of
the overall cargo movement),while rationalization will inevi
tably involve increased restrictions on competition,since it
cannot be implemented satisfactorily unless shippers adhere
to their conference loyalty agreements.

i|t an UNCTADs report 'Consultation W.achinery,Protection of
shipper interests; Ah action programme ,21 January 1975,

o
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UNCTAD further comments that the introductions of a
rationalization scheme can Ike expected to lead to a direct
reduction in the costs of a liner service,'"
The same document points out that conferences in general
are incapable of rationalizing their services because they are
unable to match their fleet size to the available cargo volume.
And it does suggest that rationalization, implying closed
conferences and strong loyalty agreements, combined with an
efficient organization of shippers, meaning an effective use
of the shippers^ combined bargaining strength, under certain
conditions ” may be much more effective than the traditional
form of competition, "
We can see later that the principle

of having 'closed

conference 'with full rationalization is fully applied in the
Code,
In U,S, there have been many academicians and govern
ment officers supporting this principle. This reflected in
the current regulatory thinking in the USA, Current thinking
on how liner shipping should be regulated is best understood
by examining the contents of a recently proposed bill in the
U,S,Congress, Although it may be subjected to further modi
fication, the embodiment of current congressional thinking
is found in HR 1878 - the Shipping Act of 1983, It also
reflects a restatement of support for rationalization agree
ments,

o
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CHAPTER lU
CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION AND PRACTICES

As mentioned before, Shipping Conferences axe not legal
entities. The members are not partners of any kind, they do
not integrate their serv/ices, they do not merge together. The
relationship among the members is contractual either in a
written or an oral gentlemen form of agreement.
««

Conference headquarters and secretariat
The chairman of the conference, in some cases, is an
independent figure not affiliated with the members. Sometimes,
the chairmanship rotates among the members. The main function
of the chairman is to direct and coordinate the conference's
rate-making. Very rarely is the coordinator given decision
making power regarding conference policies. His opinions can
be influential, but the decisions are made by the vote of all
the conference members. The basis of voting is usually one
member one vote.
The decision-making procedures vary from conference to
conference and from subject to subject. In most of the confe
rences admission of new members is only decided by unanimous
vote. In cases of rate changes, some conferences are satisfied
with a simple majority vote; whereas others require a twothirds or a three-quarters majority vote.
Some conferences establish committees to whom they
delegate powers in specific areas with decision-making authority.

a
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Decisions regarding conference activities and policies,many
times, require a unanimous vote. This might impair the ade
quacy of conferences tend to authorize selected committees,
from their members, with decision-making powers to handle
routine matters, and to leave to the full quorum only policy
matters. Sometimes the conference's chairman will be delegated
power enabling him to reach a quick solution. Other committee
may be established todo some works.: such as observe
movements trend on the route and react

the cargoes'

accordingly ±>y

adjusting the rates and contracting with the shippers.
The conferences'general assemblies meet, normally, on
prescheduled dates such as once a month or at bimonthly con
ventions, If there are urgent cases ad hoc meetings might be
held,
A non-active member, i,e,, one who declines to fullfill his sailing requirements, might lose his vote and even
tually his membership in the conference. A conference will
dissolve if the members cannot reach an agreement on major
issues like shares of trade, sailing schedules, and freight
rates.
Normally, conferences'members are equal under the
contracts. However, there are some cases in which the members
are not equal, where some members have fewer rights than
others. These 'second class 'participants are the associate
members. Their sailing righ-ts are limited and they are not
allowed to vote in conference meetings.
In some trades liners have obligations as a common

a
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carrier. In other trades there is no such obligation, but
nevertheless a general expectation that having advertised
a sailing and calls at particular ports a liner will accept
all cargo offering on that route on a "first come - first
served” basis, whether the cargo is attractive or not to
the shipowner, easy or difficult to handle, provided suita
ble space is available and the terms are mutually satisfactory,
except for certain goods which may affect the safety of ship
or cause damage to other cargoes,'
Some characteristics of conference agreements.
The conference agreement is a compromise between the
shipping companies operating on a given route. There are no
rules as to what is the ideal agreement for the regulation
of different route conditions. In many conferences, there is
not a single agreement but a set of mutually inter-related
agreements between the member lines.
The duration of the agreement is usually not specified
in the contract. The very first conference that was established
in 1875 still exists,
A conference agreement may cover all or some of the
following matters ;
a, the sphere of the conference, i.e, the range of ports which
come within the purview of the agreement;
b, types of membership, e.g. full (or regular) members and
associate members, their rights and obligations, terms and
conditions of membership, viz, admission fee, security de
posit, faithful performance bond;

9
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c, rules regarding admission, withdraiual, suspension and
expulsion of a member;
d, rules regarding conference meetings, voting procedure;
e, Conference secretariat,the officers and their duties;
f, obligation of the member lines in rate matters and in
the operation of conference services;
g, practices of member lines which are prohibited under the
conference

agreement;

h, self-policing provisions -investigation of and pe^nalties
against malpractices of the member lines;
i, appointment of committees;
j, arbitration of disputes between members, and
k, participation in other agreements.
Pooling agreements.
Pools are a natural conference adjunct in as much as
they! serve primarily to limit service competition while the
uniform rate limits price competition.
Pooling can take various forms ranging from agreements
to control the number of sailings of each pool member to a
system in which the actual cargo carried as revenue earned by
each member line is controlled. In addition to the allocation
of sailings, the conference lines may also pool cargo and/or
revenue, A cargo pool usually relates to a specific commodity
or group of commodities and under the pool each member is en-?
titled to carry a specified percentage share of the freight
tons of the item/s concerned carried by all members of the
pool. Sometimes, only cargo pools are not enough to limit

internal competition,A wide variety of cargoes move in
most conference trades,with a wide disparity in the freight
rates on the various commodities,with the result that the
members may compete with each other for high-rate cargoes.
The formation of a revenue pool eliminates competition
for the more profitable cargoes and,at the same time,ensures
that the less attractive cargoes also handled.
In a revenue pool the total freight revenue of all
the participants in the pool is shared according to aereed
percentages,Usually the revenue paid into the pool is
either a fixed percentage of total revenue,or total revenue
minus a fixed amount per ton carried,The revenue shares of
different pool members are normally matched by correspon
ding obligations to carry more or less the same percentage
of cargo as their share of the pool,In practice,therefore,
in a majority of cases the pooling agreements cover both
cargo and revenue,
A number of pools are designed primarily for ratio
nalization purposes-,.

T h e y

are regarded by the con

ferences as ’’self-imposed restrictions" agreed between mem
ber lines to provide the proper number of sailings to handle
the expected cargo movement,Restrictions on sailings are
accepted voluntarily by conference members in order to avoid
overtonnaging and duplication of sailings,
(27)
Pooling agreements include provisions regarding;-' '
1, coverage;
- carriers
- ports or coastal range

a
35.

commodities
- separate pools by commodity group.
2, operational requirements:
- minimum number of sailings,
3, pool shares:
- basis
- renegotiation period.
k , cotribution rates (revenue pools) may or may not include:
- bunker,currency adjustments
- taxes
- ad valorem charges
- container rental
- port differentials
- deductions/additions for non pier-to-pier con
tainer rates or free-in,free-out,free-in-andout rates.
5, penalities:
- forfeiture for under carriage,
6, pool transfers:
- frequency of settling accounts.
Pools covering a particular trade route can be either
"blanket" regional pools (i.e,

covering all points ujithin

a coastal renge) or port-specific pools,Pools generally
apply to the trade betu/een specified ports only,Some con
ference ports may cover non-pool ports.Different pools
may exist for different sections of the trade covered by the
conference,Some conference members operating in a particular

9
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section may operate outside the pool covering that section.
This situation usually arises where a carrier has access
to cargoes that others do not ( through cargo preference
(28)
of a country to its national lines for example).
Pooling arrangements do not necessarily cover the
whole trade,Certain commodities are,however,still consi
dered unsuitable as to include in the pool,For example,
hazardous cargo would be exempted as would be bulk cargo
such as wheat,metal ores and sugar,and those special
stowage/handling cargoes.
Some pools require that members meet extraordinary
cargo movement requests ,Associate membership in a pool
is sometimes granted whereby the associate member receives
more than some small fraction (say 2 , 5 % ) of total gross
pool revenues,then the excess (less carring allowances) is
due to the pool account,Pool shares can be fixed for a spe
cified period and subject to regualr negotiation or can
be changed only upon petition of an

unsatisfied) pool

member.
Sailings can;be allocated in the form of berthing
rights,Some pools also stipulate an even spread of sailins
over the period,If a member carries less than the minimaflj
amount he will not be compensated unless he can prove that
force majeure prevented him from filling his quota,Thus ,
allocation can take place based on the share of sailings
made,capacity provided,tonnage carried,revenues earned,or
some combination of these,The most typical arrangement is a
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ccmbined cargo/revenue pool,which allocates revenue but
provides adjustments to encourage a similar split of
tonnage carried,
U1timately,the members of a pool are interested
in their net revenues,or earnings,from providing liner
services.lt is in trying to approximate this division that
the terms of pooling agreements become too complex.The
costs of carriage of various commodities differ.
Revenue from various commodities vary accordiog to
the tariffsched ule. Serving different ports changes carrier;
costs,The pool must also take care to avoid arrangements
which might provide incentives to member to use the lines
autside the pool,
Administration of pools
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The administration of the pool itself is usually
conducted through a pool committee of the member or their
agents,This body typically keeps track of cargo movement
and vessel scheduling,and monitors members^performance.
The conference secretary is some-times -the pool secretary.
When many ports are covered by a pooling agreement,there
will often be several pool committees.
Fixing the pool shares is a critical part of the
administration of the pool,Where two or more lines of the
same flag are members of a pool,the shares are first fixed
on the basis of flag groups,then between members within
each flag group,shares may be allocated among others,on the
basis of:-
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- negotiations between pool members,
- commercial and other requirements of the trade,
- past performance of each member,
- future potential of each member,
- capacity of a line to compete as an outsider if
agreement cannot be reached,and
“ national aspirations of different members.
Conference freight rate and tariff
*•

Every member of a conference has to charge

his

services according to uniform rates as in the tariff,This
is supplemented by rules covering matters such as calculation
and correction of freight charges,In working out the freight
charges on any commodity-..between the ports served by the
conference the tariff refer to by the members of the confe
rence and their agents.
There is no set pattern for a conference tariff,but,
they usually cover some of the following;1, rules and regulations cpveting matters such as calculation
of freight charges,payment of freight;
2, commodity rates or class rates section;
3, additional charges for ports other than basis ports
which are covered direct;
4, additional charges for ports covered with transhipment;and
5, index of commodities.
Until recently the tariffs were regarded as confiden
tial by most of the conferences operating outside the jurisdic
tion of the’LbSjBhipping Act,Shippers had no idea of the gene-
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ral structure of rates in the tariff.
Conference rates are basically of two types: class
rates and commodity rates.The cargo is listed in tariffs
according to either class group or individual products
accordingly.There are tariffs according with as few as
five classes while others have upto fifty or more classes.
Rates are per class,Commodity rates catalogues the commo
dities in detail,quoting freight rates for each, commodity,
These tariffs can have up to as many a® seven or eight
thousand items depending on the quality of products carried
on the conference's vessels,Both kinds of tariffs have a
NOS (not otherwise specified ) rate for cargo not quoted
in them,This NOS rate applies to a wide variety of goods
that cannot be classified under a specific describtion or
class in the tariff.The NOS rate will usually be relatively
high when there are demands from shippers for fixing
specific rates for those new cargoes. Conferences would
consider their regularity and significant quantities of
those cargoes to be shipped,The conference prescribes that
the rates are calculated according to weight or measurement
of commodity,whichever produces the greater revenue,.Sotne
tariffs include ad valoreum charges for certain products.
Usually the tariff contains provisions dealing with packing
conditions and other characteristics of special cargo
features such as special weights,exeptione I lengths,and
unusual susceptibility to various conditions,Additional
fees are then charged accordingly.

0
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The conference generally lay down a certain minimum
freight charge per bill of lading,whatever the item carried
and however small the consignment.
Normally, all commodities described in the tariff
are accompanied by fixed freight to be' charged for their
carriage.However,at times there are some commodities with
open rates where the tariff does not quote a price for
their transportation,In cases like this,the conference members
are free to set their own rates.Open rates are usual]^ declared
in times of competition with outsiders for the transportation
of a specific product only.The open rates will usually be
attached to bulk cargo that unusually moves on conference
vessels.
Increase in freight rates
Host of the freight rate increases are general,across
the board,increases,The shipowners are unable to price the
carriage of an individual product according to exact costs.
For this reason,changes in costs have to be spread over
all the commodities carried and the increase is therefore
general,The reason for rate increases may be because of
increases in costs of operation.There is no •strict rule as
to what is the level of cost increase that justifies a rate
increase.
The general rate increase has not equivalent impact
on different commodities since the rise in freight is not
related to the price of the specific product,Some shippers
can absorb the increase while others offset it the same way
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as shipouiners do,by imposing it on the consumer or,by
endevouring to increase productivity or by obtaining
government subsidies.Those shippers,who ship low value
cargoes,are badly hurt by any rate increases,The addi
tion to the products^prices harms their competitiveness.
Most of exemption resulted from bargsi^g power
of shippers and government interventions and the conference
consideration of the result of the increase of the rate
that might reduce volume of cargoes to be shipped ,
Only the US has a statutory requirement to pub
lish thirty days in advance an intention to increase
freight rates.Decreases in rates may become effective upon
their publication and filing with the commission.
The introduction of containers in the mid -19B0s
and the increasing popularity of their usage might pave
the way for a new system of rate charging,A1though cargo
is carried in these big boxes.prices of transportation
are still based on the old tariffs,Sticking to the old
system is justified from the point of view that containers
only ease the cargo handling process while the cost con
struction of the ship's operation,in principle,does not
change.
After containerization has been introduced,there
was an idea of applying a single rate to every container
calculated to weight only,It could bring about far-rea
ching changes in world trade,If this single rate was
applied in a worldwide scale^Final prices of the vast
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majority of goods moving ujill ba changedj eithar upu/ards
or downwards,Ratas will hika on low valwe goods moving
in big quantitias,Cheap goods and semi-manufacturad pro
ducts that ara now transportad for low ratas,becausa of
tha change,might be driven out of the international market.
Averaging freight rates
The averaging of freight rates is made in various
forms.Since the ship carries an assortment of products and
the cost of carriage has to be spread among them,the tate
for each commodity incorporates a form of averaging,Dividing
a tariff into very few classes of cargo perpetuates the
averaging because products of a variety of size and weight
will be charged a similar rate,The more detailed the tariff
is,the less averaging is done;though,still,the rate is not
fixed individually for each item on the basis of its trans
portation characteristics.
Carrying the additional tons above the amount that
secures earnings plus costs'coverage is actually cheaper;
yet,the extra tons are normally charged the same rates as;'
the cargo loaded first,Because the mix of cargo cannot be
quoted^jLow value goods are charged lower rates than high
value products,The result is an average price that enables
the shipowner to operate his vessel,Low value goods'freight
rates do not cover,normally,the costs of their trasportation.
The loss has to be offset by charging the high value goods,
or the goods with an inelastic demand,higher rates,If the
subsidising commodities will be taken away by their shippers

»
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from the conference,a rate increase will have to be intro
duced. The chances of securing full loads in the back haul
of a journey are not always feasible.Therefore,the shippers
in one direction subsidize their colleagues from the other
end of the route.
The fact that a tariff quotes identical rates for a
range of ports also indicates that prices are averaged,and
somewhere along the route one shipper bears a proportionately
larger part of the rate than another,
(c

Loyalty Arrangements,
This is one of the tools used by conferences to fight
competition and to secure steady flow of cargo.Loyalty to
the conference is solicited by offering to shippers a posi
tive reward for loyalty and/or inflicting penal"ties for
disloyalty.The inducement to utilize conference lines'ves
sels exclusively is either in the form of a deferred pay
ment for a portion of the freight charges paid if the ship
per fulfils certain conditions of loyalty to the conference
lines during a prescribed intervening period or of initially
charging to those shippers who sign a loyalty with confe
rence rates lower than those charged to others who have not
signed the contract.These refer to deferred rebate and dual
rate contract accordingly.Other arrangements for charging
lower rates to loyal shippers are less common and are
usually designed for individual cases.
Loyalty arrangement in one form or another exist in most
of the trades covered by conferences,except those where there
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is no outside competition in the conference's area of
operation,nor an immediate possibility of such competi
tion emerging,Even in the trades where loyalty arrange
ments exist,there are usually ports or cargoes which are
outside the scope of those arrangements thus ports to
which the conferencedoes not wish to give a regular and
adequate service are not included in the list of "confe
rence ports" for the purpose of loyalty arrangements.
Items which are outside the purview of the loyalty
(«

arrangements are quoted at net rates,Also open rate commodi
ties are beyond the scope of the arrangements.
Under the deffered rebate system,a shipper who
utilizes exclusively the vessels of the member lines of the
conference for carriage of cargoes between the ports covered
by the conference,and considered by the conference as
conference ports for the purpose of assessing his loyalty
to the conference ,is entitled to receive a rebate of a cer
tain percentage of his total freight payments,The rebate
is computed for a designated period

(shipment period),

u-sually three to six months,but is paid after a period
(deferment period) of the samej'^ng-th following the ship
ment period,on the condition that the shipper has given
his exclusive support to the confernce lines,both during the
shipment period and the deferment period.
The conferences sometimes tighten their hold over
the shippers by increasing the percentage of deferred
rebate (and simultaneously increasing the tariff rates.
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so as not to lower the net rates below the previous level)
and/or by increasing the length of the shipment/deferment
period,Normally,the conf erences do not provide shippers
with an opportunity to 1 save the confernce,not even by
giving advance notice,wi thout losing the accumulated
rebates due to them from the.con'fernce,
/\nother device to tie the shippers is to offer them
lower rates if they sign a contract to provide exclusive p atronage to the conferenc e lines,Lower rates to contract
«C

shippers are offered under the 'dual rate'system and also
under the immediate rebate system,Only the dual rate system
is allowed in the conferences operating in the overseas r
trades of the USA in which deferred rebates are proscribed.
According to the US legislation, the dif feren^tial between
the contract and non-contract rates cannot exceed 15%
of non-contract rates.
Contract rates are offered as an alternative to the
deffered rebate system by many other conferences,Where ship
pers are given a' choice between the two systems, the per
centage of immediate rebate which is offered is less, gene
rally one-half or one percent less,than the percentage of
deferred rebate.
The ’.fundamental differences between the deferred
rebate system and the contract/non-contract rates system
are given below ;-

Deferred

rebate

system

- an offer from the confe

Du al

rate

system

a contractual arrangement

rence — no contractual

between the conference lines

arrangement involved.

and the shipper,

- shippers receive rebates

contract shippers are charged

from the conference as a

lower rates vis-a-vis non-con

reward for their loyalty

tract shippers as a right

but without contractual

under the contract,

rights,
- a shipper is obliged to

a shipper is obliged to be

be loyal both during the

loyal only during the contract

shipment period and the

period.

deferment period.
ons can

“ any revision in the terms of

con fe-

the contract needs to be by

y.

consent of both parties.

ng loya^shipper.
re of
es.

- the onus of i
proving disloyal
ty is on the confernce.
- penalty -'li quidated damages
based on the shipment made o
a non-conference vessel and
suspention/cancellatio0 _of ..I!
the -contractual agreement.
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no provision enabling

provision for terminating

the shipper to luithdrau)

the contractual arrange

his support to the con

ment by either side on due

ference by giving advance

notice -notice period

notice and still receive

usually being 90 days.

the accumulated rebates
due to him,
conference does not

conference undertakes certain

undertake any contrac

obligations towards contract

tual obligations towards

shippers, viz.

the shippers as a part of

i, a general obligation to

the deferred rebates

provide a service adequate

scheme.

to meet the ordinary require
ments of the trade;
ii, to give advance notice of
rate changes (generally 90
days);
iii, to give permission to use
a non-conference is unable
to provide space within a
reasonable time.
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TWO

THE UN CODE OF CONDUCT

HT

CHAPTER

\I

DEVELOPIVIEIMTS THAT LED TO THE EXISTENCE OF UN CODE
In March 1963, when the Governments of the West Euro
pean Maritime powers and Japan met in London and agreed that
the conference system was indispenable as a mean of enabling
shipowners to provide shippers with regular and efficient
services at stable rates; they adopted a resolution which
recommended institutional negotiation between shippings'counNT

cils and conferences. These developments encouraged the for
mation of European Shipper Council and CENSA which represent
the interests of European shippers and European shipowners
accordingly
The Rochdale Committee 1967-70
In July 1967,the U.K.government set up the Committee
of Inquiry into Shipping with the Rt Hon the Viscount Roch
dale as chairman. The Committee's terms of reference were
broad: " To review.... the organization and structure of the
United Kingdom shipping industry, its methods of operation
and any other factors which affect its efficiency and compe
titiveness,...” The Committee 's report, published in 1970
’’...concluded that as a condition of shipowners, whether UK
or foreign, continuing to benefit from the operation of re
strictive agreements relating to trade to and from the UK,
members of comferences should collectively accept a published
code of conference practice.” The Rochdale Committee was.
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infact, the first official body to suggest the need for a
code, although some academic writers had proposed this a num
bers of years previously.
The report of the Committee returned to the matter
again in the chapter 'Role of government

and recommended

that the UK government ” should encourage the rapid adootion
of a oode of conduct by conferences, and.... should initiate
discussion of the possible content of an international treaty
•c

embodying a code of shipping conduct.’!' The Committee also
wrote that it had "...reached the conclusion that a multi
lateral intergovernmental agreement on shipping will increas
ingly be seen as

desirable by all concerned with the future

efficiency and prosperity of shipping. The type of agreement
we have in mind would be one which established an agreed
code of principles within which governments should develop
their national shipping policies...". Finally, in the chapter
'Summary of recommendations ^it was stated that "Members of
conferences covering trade to and from the UK shoulld collec
tively accept a published code of conference practice, which
should contain provisions relating to the admission of new
members, the publication of

tariffs, the provision of infor

mation about revenues and costs to representatives of the
Government and of shippers, and conclusion with the Govern
ment and shippers."
There was another development initiated by developing
countries during this period of time. Within the UN, parti
cularly within the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far

9

53.

East ( nou; the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific), developing countries had begun to express their
concern about the effects of conference practices, and in 1960
even in the OEEC (now OECD) hard words were spoken against
the system.
UNCTAD. 19B/i - 1971
The first occasion on which shipping questions were
discussed in a truly representative international forum; this
was the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
held in Geneva in 1964.

In the area of shipping, the Confe-

rence adopted two Recommendations. The first stated that
objective

to promote understanding and cooperation in the

field of shipping.'The second Recommendation, A Common Pleasure
of Understanding on Shipping Questions, dealt directly with
shipping conferences and stated that » the Liner Conference
system is necessary in order to secure stable rates and re
gular services."

The Recommendation stressed the need for

cooperation and proposed to establish consultation machinery
■" with adequate procedures for hearing and remedying complaints
by the formation of shippers'councils or other suitable bodies
on a national and regional basis." The Recommendation suggested
including in consultations the following matters: publication
of conference tariffs and regulation, prior notice on sur- •
charges and rate increase, loyalty agreements, conference re
presentation in Developing countries, adequacy of service,
improvement and promotion of Developing countries'Trades, and

'
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rationalization of routes, sailings, and freight. The Eommon
Measure also dealt with port improvements and acceptance of
DCs'carriers to conferences.
After the creation of UNCTAD as a part of the perma
nent machinery of the UN, a Committee on Shipping was estab
lished,- Its programme of wouk contained' a sub item concerned
with conference practices and adequacy of shipping services,
and it was noted that it might be desirable for the secreta
riat ” to deal with some of these questions in more specialized studies,"
The report by the secretariat, the Liner Conference
System, was finished in time for the fourth session of the
Committee in 1970. The report of the debate in the Committee
notes that, since conferences were monopolistic and restricted
competition, conference practices should be subject to govern
ment regulation.” One representative noted ” that conferences
by definition represented a denial of free competition and
consequently had to be regulated by the governmental autho
rities of the countries whose trade they served.” Even some
representatives of developed countries ” maintained that ex
perience in their countries suggested that certain abuses of
the conference system could be prevented by government regu
lation.”
The resolution adopted by the Committee ” Agrees that
further improvements in the liner conference system are neces
sary and would be in the common interests of shippers and .
shipowners.”

It was decided to transmit the secretariat

a
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study to the UNCTAD Working Group on International Shipping
Legislation (WGISL).
The WGISL considered the study at its second session
in Febuary 1971. There were sharply divergent views expressed
at the meeting; in general, the developed countries considered
that, before the matter was discussed further at the technical
level, it should be refered back to the Committee for discus
sion of the policy issues involved; the developing and socia
list countries considered that the matter was urgent particu—
«<

larly in view of the decisions adopted by CSP.' meeting in
Tokyo,Japan (see below), held in the same month as the WGISL.
The developing countries in particular stressed that, since
they had not been invited participate in the formulation of
the self-regulatory Code of conduct which it had been decided
should be produced, UNCTAD needed to press ahead with its own
work without delay. A resolution to consider the subject of
conference practices at the third session of the WGISL and
expressing ” the hope that its work on conference practices
will lead to the formulation of internationally acceptable
appropriate rules of conduct for Liner Conference" was adopted.
In answer to the request made at this second session of the
WGISL,the UNCTAD secretariat produced at the end of 1971 a
further report, the Regulation of Liner Conferences. As its
title implies, the report considered various methods of regu
lating conferences, and concluded that the only method which
would meet the criteria developed in the report itself was an
international convention with provision for local and inter-
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national arbitration for the settlement of disputes. It went
on to examine the various deficiencies in current conference
practices, drawing the material from the previous secretariat
report, and to present solutions to rectify these deficiencies.
The solutions formed, in themselves, a code (indeed the last
chapter was called "Rules of conduct (code) for liner confe
rences". )

These provisions were the origin of the Code of

Conduct, and the form and structure suggested in the Regula
tion of Liner Conferences can still be seen clearly^in the
Code.
CSP r'leetinq in Jap^n
At the initiative of the UK government, CSP met in
Tokyo on 2 and 3 Febuary 1971. Twelve countries were present
and in the communique issued after the meeting they "...con
firmed their view that the liner conference system played an
essential role, and that it should continue to function by
self regulation to the greatest possible extent." They agreed,
however,that "...the time had come to determine what futher
developments were needed in connection with liner conferences."
They then resolved that :
a) it was essential that conferences should not only
observe but also be seen to observe certain principles of
fair practice?
b) they should promote the acceptance by conference of
a published code of practice, which should take due account
■f

of the criticisms against conferences;

CSP -(The Consultative Shipping Group) is a group consist
of the Western European and Japan ministers responsible for
maritime transport.
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c) they should aim initially at acceptance of the code
by conferences serving the trade of their countries while
bearing in mind the ultimate objective that such a code should
receive worldwide endorsement.
The governments present at the meeting requested their
shipowners jointly toelaborate the details of a code of prac
tice and to present them to the governments for further con
sideration before 31 December 1971, The request for code of
practice was believed to be intended particularly to meet the
«c

demands of developing countries. And the reason for the limitting the time for the draft was an attempt to be ready before
the next UNCTAD meeting.

The recommendation of the ministers

contained a great deal which followed the Rochdale proposals.
As a result the code developed by European and Japanese
shipowners and'shippers was dated 3 November 1971, It was
known,- as

CENSA Code,

UNCTAD 1972 - 74
UNCTAD III

The two streams came together at UNCTAD III

held in Santiago,Chile, in April and May 1972, By now all
countries accepted both the necessity for, and the inevita
bility of, a code of conduct. But the overall agreement could
not be reached; however Resolution 66 (III) was adopted. The
Resolution stated that there was an urgent need for adopting
and implementing a universally-acceptable code of conduct for
liner conferences and requested the General Assembly to con
vene a conference of plenipotentiaries as early as possible

&
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in' 1973 to adopt such a code. The draft code produced by
the developing countries (the Santiago draft), was amended
to the resolution.
Acting upon the Resolution, the UN General Assembly
adopted Resolution 3035 (XXXUIl) which inter alia established
a AS member preparatory committee which met for two sessions
in January and June 1973 to prepare a text for submission '
to the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, At the end of the
second session of the preparatory Committee a proposed text
of a’code of conduct emerged. There was widespread agreement
on the headings to be included, as indeed there had been at
Santiago, but the differences on a number of fundamental issues
remained as wide as they had ever been. The proposed text
submitted to the Conference, therefore, contained alternative
texts for a large number of the provisions. Indeed, it would
be fair to say that the work of the Preparatory Committee had
been largely to array the alternatives rather than to resolve
differences.
The Conference of Plenipotentiaries was scheduled to
meet from 12 November to 1A December, However, it was not
possible to complete the work in the period and accordingly
one day was added to the first part of the Conference and a
second part was scheduled from 11 to 29 March 1974, eventually
extended to 6

April, When the final vote was taken 72 coun

tries voted in favour of the Code, seven against it and five
abstained.

o
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CHAPTER UI
SOME KEY ISSUES REGARDING ITS IMPLEMENTATION.
1 • The structure of the Code^. ^
The Code is in the form of a Convention annexed to
the final Act of the Conference of Pleniootentiaries. A second
annex to the Final Act contained three resolutions in that
the terms of the Convention are binding on states ratifying
it once it enters into force, whereas resolutions are opera
tive once they are adopted, but are never binding on the
countries which have voted for them.
The Code itself starts off with a statement of Objec
tives and Principles. This is followed by seven chapters
divided into two parts. Part One consists of five chapters
and contains the substance of the Code, Part Two contains two
chapters concerned with the implementation of the substance
of Part One,
Part One begins with the definition of certain impor
tant terms used in the Code, including such matters as a
liner conference, a national shipping line and a third-country
shipping line. The next chapter, "Relations among member
lines," deals with membership of conferences, sanctions on
conference members, self-policing and the availability of
conference agreements. The articles of this chapter are highly
controversial and constitute the main stumbling black to
support for the Code from European countries. Chapter III
deals with "Relations with shippers. " and has articles

covering loyalty arrangements^ the granting of dispensation
to use non-conference vessels, the availability of tariffs
and related conditions, annual reports, and very importantly,
consultation machinery. One common element in all the various
proposals for a code is the importance attached to consulta
tion as a means of both avoiding and resolving disputes
between conferences and shippers. In general. Chapter III
is shown by the fact that most of the articles and paragraphs
were adopted without objection by the Conference,
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Chapter IV deals with freight rate questions. It starts
with criteria for freight rate determination, while subsequent
articles deal with different questions related to freight
rates. This chapter is the one most likely to give rise to
disputes in the operation of the Code, not from any inade
quacies in its provisions or drafting, although parts of
article 14 in particular are rather obscure, but simply
from the fact that freight rate questions are the cause of
virtually all of the friction which occurs between conferen
ces and shippers. It needs to be noted that none of the pa
ragraphs of chapter lU contain the mandatory "shall” without
qualification and that full provision is made for the parties
concerned to agree on other criteria, procedures and time
limits. Indeed, since in the end almost everything is per
missible it is difficult to understand the controversy
which the various articles raised.
Chapter IV is headed "Other matters” and is, in fact,
something of a ragbag. There is an article- on fighting ships.

another on adequacy of service, articles on the head office
of a conference and on representation, and finally an arti
cle providing that conference agreements of whatever type
shall conform to the applicable requirements of the Code,
The final chapter is headed “Final clauses,” This
provides, under the article .on Implementation that "Each
Contractiirtg Party shall take such legislative or other measures
as may be necessary to implement the present Convention”
(Article 47), A further article deals with signature, ratification, acceptance, approval and accession and is followed
by one on the conditions for entry into force.
The first annex to the Convention contains model of
procedure for international mandatory conciliation : these
shall be considered as model rules for the guidance of
conciliators...,” who may”,...use, supplement or amend the
rules..,, or formulate their own rules of procedure.,,,”
(Article 45 paragraoh 2), Clearly, nothing could be more
flexible.
Annex II contains three resolutions adopted by the
Conference. The first relates to the completion of the work
of the conference and was necessitated by its failure to
complete its work in one session as scheduled. The second
resolution concerns non-conference shipping lines and atterripts
to preserve the position of non-conference operators and the
choice of shippers between conference and non conference
lines. The third resolution deals with local conciliation,
proposals for which were dropped by developirrg countries.
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presumably because there was insufficient time to negotiate
them. This resolution '’Requests the first Review Conference
,,,,to give priority consideration to the subject of local
conciliation..,.”
2, Objectives and principles.
The Code states the fundamental objectives and basic
principles as following :
a. The objective to facilitate the orderly expansion of world
sea-borne trade;
b. The objective to stimulate the development of regular
and efficient liner services adequate to the requirements
of trade concerned;
c. The objective to ensure a balance of interests between
suppliers and users of liner shipping services;
d. The principle thart conference practices should not involve
any discrimination against the shipowners, shippers or
the foreign trade of any country;
e. The principle that conferences hold meaningful consultations
with shippers^ organisations, shippers^ representatives
and shippers on matters of common interest, with upon
request, the participation of appropriate authorities;
f. The principle that conferences should make available to
interested parties pertinent information about their acti
vities which are relevant to those parties and should oublish meaningful information on their activities.
However, it should be noted and emphasized that the objectives

of the Code can be found not only here in the preamble to
the Code, but also the points of view expressed by delegates,
particularly at the closing session of the conference of
plenipotentiaries. Houpv/er, the below statements are summary
of the answers to the question ; Why was the Code needed
a. remove from the conferences the power arbitraly to decide
on the admission of new lines and thus whether or not
shipping lines could operate in particular trades;
b. provide that the allocation of cargoes within conferences
should take place on an internationally agreed basis
rather than through the private arrangements by which
shares were traditionally determined;
c. bring into open the levels of conference freight rates and
the processes of conference decision taking;
d. restrict the powers of cartels formed lines, usually foreign
to the country concerned, to take unilateral decisions on
matters vitally affecting the trade development of these
countries; and
e. establish an independent tribunal to which parties with
complaints about the operation of the system could have
recourse.
And also the princioles Governing the Code can be
viewed from another angle :
1. Fundamentally, the Liner Code seeks to enable developing
countries to achieve their aspirations in the field of
liner shipping within the broad framework of a largely
self-regulating system of liner conferences with the
minimum level of government intervention.
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The system of international mandatory conciliation
for the settlement of disputes itself has also been drafted
in a manner as to be compatible with the pervading spirit
of the code which is to find mutually acceptable solutions
to problems through amicable means,
2, Basing itself largely on the principle of a self-regula
ting system of liner conferences, the code provides through
its Articles a set of principles relating to :
a, membership of liner conferences
««

b, cargo sharing arrangements within conferences
c, internal rules of conferences
d, relations between shippers and conferences including
consultation machinery
e, freight rates and surcharges
f, dispute settlement machinery
These orovisions, while seeking to find solutions to
the legitim§£e.-:grievances of developing countries, whether
in their efforts to develop their liner fleets or in their
efforts to obtain for their shippers a fair deal from con
ferences, have drawn upon the best of conference practices
and should present no difficulty in their practical- applica
tion, In fact, in their relations with shippers many confe
rences have already for sometime, been gearing themselves
to the provisions of the Code, Similarly the principles of
cargo sharing enumerated in the Code today have general
acceptance in conference circles,
3, A feature which runs through the Code in all its clauses
is its flexibility. With regard to virtually all the
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fundamental clauses such as cargo sharing, period between
freight rate increases, settlement of disputes etc. there
is provision for adopting alternative solutions by mutual
agreement
A. Another significant element of the Code is the role
assigned to the " appropriate authorities ” of Government,
While accepting that Governments have a right to particir*
pate in certain matters such as consultations between
shippers and conferences, the role envisaged for "appropriate authorities ” is essentially a low profound one a consultative role more than a decision making one,
5, While the Code is essentially an instrument which
applies to liner conferences,the authors of the Code accepted
the right of outsiders to operate in competition with Con
ferences, This fact is illustrated by Resolution Number 2
on the subject of Non-Conference Shipping Liner adopted by
the Conference of Plenipotentiaries at the time the Code
itself was adopted in April 1974. This resolution while
reiterating that the Code was prepared with a view to im
proving the liner conference system, and that the Code is
applicable to liner conferences and their external rela
tions, states explicitly that nothing in the Code shall be
construed so as to deny shippers the option of using non
conference lines, subject to any loyalty agreements where
they exist and as long as outside lines operate on the
basis of ” fair competition on a commercial basis.”

BB.

3i. Character of the Code
I ,

I', The Code accepts the diversity existing within the con
ference system, thereforsi. when coming t^o the applica
tion,. It is a question of finding the particular mqan
appropriate for appling its principles to the specific'
ponference.
The Code was designed to right old wrongs, which are not
necessarily the same as the current wrongs which need
righting.
}

-

'

»
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It is important to bear in mind in assessing the Code

in relation to current shipping practices,namely, that it
was designed to right old wrongs and, in doing so,was
based on a Secretariat report completed iq 19B9 and,thus,
basically referring to the system current in about 1965,
to that extent the Code was out date when it was adopted.
3,

speed with which the Code was adopted has resulted
in some ambiguities of wording which will require careful .interpretation in application,
I •,

1

In 1971, the preparation of the Code of Conduct did

commence, and in just three years the Code was adopted.
Some of the difficulties regarding its application stem
!
from this haste to bring the instrument to fruition,
,

4, The Code is flexible. It rarely imposes, and very rarely
hectors by the use of the word "shall" , and then only

1
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in connection with principles to observe,rather than
■with practices to adopt. This is a strength because it
does not tie the hands of parties to world liner ser
vices, If in a particular trade the parties agree to
follow practices other than those suggested in the Code,
.they will be acting absolutely in accordance with .the
Code so long as the agreement was not imposed by the
stronger party on the weaker.
In the absence of any record of the debates,interpreta
tion must take into account every piece 'of interpreta
tive material,even if not juridicial.ly sound. One other
problem which will arise in the application of the Code
is that there are no official s records of the debates,
It was decided very early in the proceedings leading
to the conference of Plenipotentiaries that the debates
should not take place.in public session,which meant that
no record was made of the discussions. With most national
laws and international agreements there is eithera full
record of the debates or an agreed set of minutes.
Without these,there will be no officially agreed or
accepted

way of knowing what the intentions of dele

gates were and so no guidance, other than the text of
* the Code itself,
‘
(7)
4,The scope of Application of the Code
1,

The preamble to the Code underlines its applicability
to liner conferences in 7 of the 9 paragraphs contained
in that section;thus it seems that the Code applies to

liner conferences,but not to lines or trades which are
not organised in a conference. Similarly Chapter 1 de
fines "goods carried by the conference" as any "cargo
transported by shipping lines members of a conference
in accordance with the conference agreement," This
wording,too,indicates that only cargo transported as
enumerated will be subject to the order of the Code,
consequently,the Code does not apply to shipping lines
that erre not members of a conference or to cargoes
carried by members lines other than in accordance with
the conference agreement. This conclusion is a contro
versial one. At the time when the Code was drafted,
conferences ' were

-• identified with liner trade. Con

ferences played--'k j dominant role,carrying 90 percent
of liner cargoes. But now conferences are carrying just
half of the trade. So another interpretation try to base
on the intentions of the drafters of the Code that the
Code be apnlied to almost the whole part of liner trade.
The use of expressions such as " trade" and "conference
services" beeing almost interchangeable during those
debates before/after the Code was adopted.
Article 2 deals with the participation of various ship
ping lines,Article 2(l7) widens and delineates the scope
of cargo to which the Code is applicable by stating
that the provisions of the 16 previous subsections
of this article,which deals with the manner of regu
lating participation in the trade,concern "all goods
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regardless of their origins,their destination or
the use for which they are intended,with the excep
tion of military equipment for national defence pur
poses”,This indicated that the Code applies to all

by
goods carried conferences irrespective of whether
the goods ariginate in the ^fpountry in which the
loading port is situated or whether they are destined
to the country in which the discharging port is situated,
3,

The Code applissto what are now called "self-reguTated"
conferences,i,e, conferences which do not serve-US:.vtype regulated liner trades,since clearly Conferences
which are publicly regulated comprehensively inwards
and outwards inconsistently with the provisions of the
Code would fall outside the scope of the Code for so
long as non-contracting party states overtly reject it,
and do'. not permit its provisions to apply within their
claimed national jurisdictions. By the same token a
State., might not be a Contracting Party,yet acquiesce
in the functioning of the Code within its jurisdiction.
Some one—third of all conferences serve US liner trades
which are regulated inwards and outwards by statute law
and regulation. The Code would thus prima facia only
apply to the remaining two-thirds of the world^s con
ferences for so long as the USA or other non-contracting
state party does not accept or acquiesce in the opera
tion of the Code within its claimed jurisdiction. Liner
Conferences trading with such countries would continue

e
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to function as they do today.
4.

Another question which may be of considerable importance
i# the application of the Code to cargoes covered by
bilateral trade agreements. While no clear provision
of the Code refers to this matter,the COMECON countries,
which have already adhered to the Code;have done so with
the reservation that cargo covered by bilateral or inter
government agreements is specifically excluded. This
attitude was fore-shadowed by an authoritative comervtator
•C

on the Code shortly after it had been acceptedjwho wrote:
"In light of the 'statements made to the Diplomatic Con
ference it is plain that such agreements would prima
facie be exempt from the Code."
5,

The Council of the ^^uropean Communities, in May 1979,adopted
a resolution which s'ets out the common position of EEC
countries to the Code and also a model reservation which
EEC countries will make in adopting the Code, Under this
reservation;
- Article 2 of the Code dealing with the principles
of partieipation in trade (cargo sharing,berthing/sailing
schedules etc.)
- Article 3 dealing with conference decision making
procedure;and
- Article 1

clause 9 specifying a minimum period of

15 months for the interval between general freight rate
increases;are excluded from application to intra EEC
trade and also to trades between EEC states and other

<9
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OECD counteies, subject to reciprocal agreements.
The implications of this reservation are:
(a) EEC shipping lines will be treated on a common
footing with regard to cargo sharing rights irrespective
of specific nationality,insofar as all intra EEC confe
rence trades are concerned. In short,for the purposes
of the Code,the EEC could be deemed to be a single country
insofar as intra EEC conference trades are concerned.
This principle would cover trades with OECD countries
which sign^reciprocal agreements with the EEC.
(b) Shippers in intra EEC trades and EEC/OECD trades
which are the subject of reciprocal agreement will not
have the right to a 15 month minimum freeze period bet
ween freight rate increases,
(c) The'.EEC reservation does not however negate the
rights accruing under the Code to extra EEC third flag
countries to participate in intra EEC trades.
6,

By and large the Code will be effective in respect of:
- conference trades between developing countries and
developed market economy countries which are Contracting
Parties,
- conferences trades between developing countries
which are Contracting Parties,
The immediate practical impact will no doubt be on

conference trades between developed market economy and de
veloping countries. In the long run,however, as the trade
between developing countries increases,the Code will naturally

0
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become more important as an instrument which regulates ship
ping relations between developing countries according to the
principle of equality of nations,
(9)
5.The Wain Provisions and its Application
a), nembership in Conferences,
Membership of lines in conferences is dealt with i
in Article 1 of Chapter 2,Membership in a conference had
once been a basic prerogative of the shipping lines forming
that bodyjnow under the Code,it is to be regulated iQ ac
cordance with principles to be established by an inter
national convention,rather than the consensus of the
members•
The Code distinguishes between national shipping
lines,which are defined in Chapter 1 as ”a vessel-operating carrier which has its head office of management and
its effective control in that country,and is recognized
as such by an appropriate authority of that country or
under the law of the country” and shipping lines which
are not national•lines and which are referred to as
"third-country shipping lines",
A national line has an aut’6 matic right to a full
member in a conferance which serves the foreign trade of
his country,f^aragraph 2 of Article 1 entitles a national
shipping line seeking admission to a conference to include
the use of chartered tonnage as evidence of its ability
and intention to provide regular services,Third-country
shipping lines,on the other hand,must not only own ves
sels but also overcome the hurdl.es-

a subjective analy-
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sis of the need for the admission of such a line,the
guidelines for which examination are defined in Article
1

(3 ).Lip service is paid to the principle that decisions

on membership apolication are not to be taken in an arbi
trary manner;an obligation is imposed on the conference
to give in writing the grounds for a refusal (Article
1 (4

)),The conference is also instructed to take into ac

count the views put forward by shippers^organization of
the countries whose trade is carried by the conference
(Article l(5)),The assumtion is that such organizations
will,in general,encourage competition,in so far as it is
possible within the confines of a conference,by favoring"
the admission of additional lines.
Attention should be drawn to one of the criteria
provided for the admission of non-national lines,Article
1 (3)(d) 'states that one criterion is "current partici
pation of the shipoing line in trade on the same route
or routes outside the framework of a conference",The
primary intention in maintaining outsiders is to check
conferences^efficiency and to give an option to shippers
to ship their goods with outsiders if needed.
The assumption that the Code foresees and tole—rates the continued existence of outsider, sevices is
further strengthened by the fact that Article 7 devotes
considerable space to loyalty arrangements to be set up
between the conference and the shippers,And,it was pre
sumed that loyalty arrangements will go on to be an _
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effective device to fight competition from outsiders,
b). Cargo Sharing Provisions,
Article 2 of the Code is headed "Participation
in trade".The provisions of this article have been the
most controversial,Article 2(4) states that,unless
otherwise mutually agreed,the following principle regar
ding the right of lines to participate in the trade car
ried must be observed:- The group of national shipping lines of each of two
countries the foreign trade between which is carried
by the conference shall have equal rights to partici
pate in the freight and volume of traffic generated
by the mutual foreign trade and carried by the confe
rence ;
- third-country shipping lines,if any,shall have the
right to acquire a significant part,such as 20^,in
the fTeight and volume of traffic generated by that
trade.
The two paragraphs above, were, wellknown as 40-40-20
formula.
Article 2(5) makes provision for a case in which
there is no national shipping line in one of the countries
concerned;that country's^share shall be distributed among
the individual member lines in proportion to their respec
tive share.
Article 2(B) makes another case when one of the
national ship.oing lines decide not to carry its full share
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of trade.
Article 2(7) for the unlikely event when the natio
nal shipping lines ef-tuio countries do not participate in
the trade between those countries which aV.e covered-tiy
conference.
The Code regards all national shipping lines existing
in one country and serving a particular trade as a block,
entitled to the same percentage of the trade as the group
of national shipping lines of the other country^sThe dividing
up of the piece of the cake allocated to that group among
its participant members is left to "mutual agreement",
which presumably means the customary commercial process
that lines now apply when distributing shares in a confe
rence trade. The division of shares among third-country
shipping lines appears to be left to commercial negotiations
among those lines more by implication than by express pro
visions, •The code displays a marked preference for pooling
arrangements to:.form .the basic cargo-sharing provisions.
As Article 2(2) states:”when a conference operates a pool,
all shipping lines member of the conference ,,..shall
have the right to participate in the pool.,.,". Article
2 (a ),

as already cited, lay down the principle for deter

mining the share of individual member lines. The pooling
theme is continued in Article 2 (l 3):.-"Where no pooling,
berthing, sailing or other trade participation agreements
exist in a conference, either group of national shipping
lines, members of the conference, may require that pooling
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arrangements be introduced

The alternative to pooling

arrangements forseen by the articles in an adjustment of
sailings, desigeedcto provide substantially the same
rights to participants in the trade as they would have
enjoyed had there been a pool.
Article

2

(2 ) above put an end to the situation in

which they are first and second class members in a.'.eonference.
In a passage in this article of particularly obscure
drafting, the groups of national shipping lines of the
«C

country at each end are given a majority vote in enforcing
such a decision within the conference. A strict time limit
of a period not exceeding six months from the receipt of
the request is set for setting up a pool or appropriate
alternative arrangements. In the event of disagreement
between the national shipping lines of the countries concerned,
what is in effect and appeal to the appropriate authorities
of these countries to bring their weight to bear in the
matter is contained in Article 2(lA), As a last resort,
disputes on this matter are to be dealt with in accordance
with the conciliation procedure of the Code,
Some problems regarding the application of cargo sharing.
There are disputes aris^g' regarding the scope of
application of cargo sharing. There are two different inter
pretations as following:
1, Applying the cargo sharing provisions to the conference
market share of the trade;
2. Applying the cargo sharing provisions to the total liner
trade.
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One important point in all of this is that when
the Code was adopted outsiders were relatively unimportant.
Today, they may carry as much as 30^ overall.
Those who are in favour of the first interpretation
are mainly the traditional maritime countries, especially
those with strong traditional cross-trading operations.
And also, shippers from many countries who fear that if
the cargo sharing

ig - applied to the total liner trade,

there will be no alternative for them other than to ship
their goods with conference vessels. The primary criteria
of the code that indeoendent lines be maintained to check
the efficiency of conference operation will be eliminated.
And, the problem will arise that who will ■ ' control the
checking and maintaining the record of loadings of outsiders
normally in respect of cargo sharing, in those conferences
where the system was installed, the conferences, usually
through a special pool secretariate, was responsible for
three distinct tasks, namely:
- To fix the share in the traffic of each member;
- To maintain a record of the loadings of each member;
- To operate a system wherby over-carriers compensated
under-carriers.
Clearly that any cargo sharing system must be
administered. The conference should occupy itself with the
task. Indeed, if cargo carried outside the conference is
to be subject to the cargo sharing rules, the conference
can not do the job.
But if we let free outsiders to oompete with confe-
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rence and allocates the cargo share from cargoes carried
by conferences. We might find soon that many conferences
will dissolve, ffnd, future liner services will be dominated
by strong outsiders with advanced and modern vessels. In
contrast with conferences, national shipping lines of
developing countries are weakening.
c). Freight rates.
Chapter four of the Code convention, entitled "Freight
rates", contains articles 12-17 inclusive. Articles 12 and
iC

14 of which can regarded as the crucial ones and thus
warrant emphasis. Article 12, named "Criteria for freight
rate determination" sets forth four criteria for the pur
pose of determining freight rates. It stipulates that "in '
arriving at a decision on questions of tariff policy..,,
the following points shall, unless otherwise provided, be
taken into account", then it specifies the first criterion
declaring that:
"Freight rates shall be fixed at as low a level as
is feasible from the commercial point of view, and shall
permit a reasonable profit for shipowners;"
The second criterion is as follows:
"The cost of operations of conferences shall, as a
rule, be evaluated for the round voyage of ships, with the
outward and inward directions considered as a single whole.
Where applicable, the outward and inward voyage should be
considered separately,";

<9

79.

The third criterion by stating that : •
” the freight rates should take into account,
among other factors,the nature of cargoes,the inter
relationship between weight and cargo measurement, as
well as value of cargoes";
The fourth criterion relating to fixing promo
tional freight rates and/or special freight rates for
specific goods,conference shall take into account the
conditions of trade for these goods of the countries*4
particularly developjjng

and land-locked countries.

Some of these criterion seem to be'RBndatory as
we can see from the uses of the word "shall" but allways
there is an escape clause as in this case "uhless otherwise
provided" is used,One point which is not clear is the
Code is silent on the person or persons by whom the
otherwise alternative criteria can be provided,Never
theless ,there should be no problem as it can be safely
interoreted that the alternative criteria to be provided
by shinocrs and conferences tlsr.ough the consultative pro
cess.
Another observation is that the part of the first
criterion requiring freight rates to be fixed at as low as
commercially possible and to permit a resonable profit.
In a general sense,this criterion is clear and

coincides

with the Code's objective to facilitate the orderly expan
sion of world sea-borne trade,although quantification may
give problems,particularly of expressions such as "as low
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as possible ” and ” reasonable”,Hou to determine them?.

The Round l/oyaqe Concept
At first uje should

knota

why wes the round

voyage concept introduced into the Code? It was intro
duced into the Code in order to insure that shipoers
c"uld take into account the allocation of costs between
the different rates of the journey and that freight rates
on one leg are not fixed in isolation from those on the
(«

other,There is evidence that where consultation is weaker
in a developing country at one end of a trade than in
a developed country at the other end of that trade,
freight rate increases tend to be larger in the outward
than in the inward trade of that developing country.
This is another reasonable question to be discussed but
again the question is,how far it is practicable?
It is concerned with the calculation of the ope
rational costs of a conference.The criterion states that
the cost ” be evaluated for the round voyage of ships,
with the outward and inward directions considered as a
single whole”.The Co'de does not furnish any indication
concerning the circumstances under which the two voyages
could be separated for making the calculations of the
voyage costs,
are
There/difficulties in evaluating costs under this
concepts,There are certain problems in costing arising
from the nature of liner operations.

Certain costs can be attributed directly to the cargo carried,
and so are easy to handle^cargo handling costs are a clear
example. Other costs can be directly attributed to the voyage,
for example,fuel costs,stores consumed,since these costs
would have been avoided had the voyage not been made .Finally,
there are the costs which are common to the organization but
cannot,except arbitrarily,be attributed to specific activi
ties; the most important of these are capital costs. Then
We-

come to the allocation of cost among voyages. There are
Mr

three problems: The first is to determine how much of the
general overheads ^ach voyage should bear. The second is to
determine how the direct costs of each voyage, including its
overhead share,are to be allocated between the constituent
parts of the voyage. The criterion of the Code basically
addresses itself to the second problem. Thus,in their consult3tions, all parties would be concerned with the allocation
of the attributed voyage costs over the various legs of the
voyage, as well as with the allocation of ” leg ” costs over
cargo items,which,in the oast, has been their sole concern.
However, the first problem cannot be ignored and the distri
bution of general overheads is a rich source of potential
conflict,particularly with capital costs of between 40 and
50 percent of annual costs for container and ro-ro shipping,
compared with 20 to 30 percent of conventional liners. What
have been mentioned above would be more difficult

if it

involvec/many ships belonging to many companies in a conference.
Those ships are not the. same and are switched between trades

&
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in response to variations in the demand for tonnage and a
number of ports in different countries are served.
In some actual cases, the shippers^council and the
conference together chose groups of representative shipp
and used only this costs to determine the overall situation.
The various problems which are involved do not des
troy the usefulness of the round voyage concept; but their
solution inevitably introduces arbitrary elements into the
costing. The question of how-, indirect costs are allocated
Mr

between the constituent sections of a voyage is one of de
terminants in the level of freight rates to be charged on
each of these. The greater the arbitrary element, the less
the cost figures used to justify the level of freight rates
represent reality.
There are more than one group of shippers from
different countries at both end of the trade fenvolved.The
consufetions regarding freight rates for the outward trip
and for the return trip,do not take place at the same time,
nor at the same place,while the shippers are not the same
at two consultations. The common element is the conference,
which immediately increases the power of the conference re
lative to that of the shippers. It is very possible that
the presentation of "an aggregated analysis of data regard
ing relevant costs and revenues which in the opinion of the
conference necessitate an increase in freight rates’
.' arti
cle 1A (3 )

would reinforce the power of the conference

because it obliges the shippers themselves to propose the
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division of the costs between the two voyages,something for
which they are not well qualified. It is for this reason
that we have insisted on the conference itself making the
proposed division even if, in -a normal situation, any di
vision of costs,of whatever type, bears arbitrary elements.
Conference Tariffs and Classification of Tariff Rates
It is worthwile to look briefly at Article 13, which
states in part that ’’Conference Tariffs should be drawn up
simply and clearly; containing as few -elasses/categories
as possible,.,” and in order to facilitate,:statistical com
pilation and analysis. The corresponding appropriate code
number of the item should be indicated in accordance with
the Standard International Trade Classification,the Brussels
Tariff Nomenclature or any other nomenclature that may be
internationally adopted.
There is no problem with this and it would be useful
to have commodities tied to the Brussels nemenclature, or
the Standard International Trade Classification (SlTC),or
other international nsmenclature. This would help to make
tariffs easier to understand. The adoption of the same system
for the tariffs and the cargo manifests by the port and by
the customs would not only facilitate statistical collection
but also reduce problems of accidental improper declarations
gt the customs.Further it will simplify international trade
movements and shippers-shipowners negotiations. And finally
the BTN makes it easier to classify commodities and thus
assists in eliminating the use of the arbitrary NOS rates.

General Freight ~ Rate INCREASES
Article 1A concerning the process of general freight
rate increases, Let^s explain by. dividing it into 2 main
parts :
J,

Notification of intention. Article 14 (l) when a

Conference has intention to increase general freight rate,
the Code requires that the Conference shall give advance
notice of not less than 150 days or otherwise agreed period
to those interested parties,of its intention to effect ,a
general increase in freight rates. The notice shall indicate
the extent of the increases,the date of effect and the rea
sons supporting the proposed increase.
Those interested parties are shippers^organizations
or representatives of shippers and/or shippers and where so
required,to appropriate authorities of the countries whose
trade is served by the Conference,
2,

Consultation, Article 1A (2) the next step is for

consultations to be held at the request of those interested
parties described above to be made within an agreed period
of time after receipt of the notice and ''consultations shall
commence within a stipulated period not exceeding 30 days
or as .previously agreed between the parties concerned,"
Before going on, we should note that three problems
of apolication already arise,namely:
- that a single shipper,even if he is of a minor status,
or only occasionally sending cargoes,has the power to request
consultations even in the face of a refusal from all other
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parties ’'prescribed in this Code";
- the period of time allowed to the shippers is not sti
pulated in the Code; and
- it seems that the 30 days term does not enter into
c

force until after the axpiration of the non-stipulated term;
however,the text as regardsrthis question is not clear.
As regards the third problem,common sense indicates
that the two terms should be consecutive and that the second
one does not include the first. But the article does not
support common sfense because it reads: ” if no agreement
is reached within 30 days of the giving of notice in accor
dance with article 1A(l),.,the matter shall be submitted
immediately to international mandatory .conciliation, in
accordance with chapter VI , Article 1A (5), Therefore the
30 days period appears to contain everything.
Paragraph 3 of the article speaks about a " report
from independent accountants of repute," the preparation
of which " any of the parties " has the right to request
" in an effort to expedite consultations ", The Conference
can submit,if it so wishes,such a report without awaiting
the request of anyone. The report should be submitted to
the participabts "where practicable,reasonably before the
consultations," At this point, it sound strange that how
can one ever imagine that a report which is made in order
to expedite the consultations and which does not reach its
destination in sufficient time prior to the starting of
consultations to enable the shippers to study it " be accepted

as one of the bases of consultation ?" There is no question
of ”if possible.”
And a 30 day term giv/en to undertake the following
actions is sound insufficient:
- the receipt of the request by the conference;
- the given of an assignment to the accountants with
all necessary information;
- the preparation of the report;
- the sending of^the report to the conference;

^

- the study of the report by the conference;
- the sending of the reoort to all designated parties;
and
- study of the report by the shippers.
And to undertake the study of the report, we should
expect on event that the shippers use other accountants,
equally capable, in order to explain the report elaborated
by the first. Because ,in accounting,there always be many
points which are arbitrary and are established on a basis
of hypothesis which are unlikely to be explained in the
report.
One of the most controversial provisions of the Code
in the matter of freight rates is the 15 month freight rate
freeze,“subject always to the rules regarding surcharge and
regarding adjustment in freight rates consequent upon divided
into two parts,namely, 150 days notice period plus 10 months
between the date when one general freight rate increase be
comes effective and the day of notice of the next general
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freight rate i n c r e a s e A r t i c l e 14(9))
Those provisions received quite a list of criticisms.
One of them is ” the Code mandates rate increases every
fifteen months a naive attempt to control and stabilize
costs.... however,economic realities will induce exactly
the opposite effects. Carriers will most assuredly post
hefty increases on schedules every fifteen months,both
in anticipation of high costs in the future and to compen
sate for what they perceive to have been a shortfall in
<«

the prior term,”
A question might be raised here is will the condi
tions for general freight rate increases lead to greater
use of surcharges,increases for particular clauses oficargo,
and/or substantial rate increases which seek to affect un
known future costs increases every 15 months ?
d). Relation with shipoers •
The third chapter of the Code Convention is entitled
"Relations with shippers” Article 7 deals with loyalty arr
angements, Article 7(l) requires that these "arrangements
shall

be based on the contract system or any other system,

which is also lawful.”
Given that the original intention was that with the
Code the deferred rebate system should be abolished as a
form of loyalty tie. If a country has ratified the Code and
want to outlaw the deferred rebates. It would be advisable
to make the matter clear in the implementing legislation
since normally anything not declared unlawful# So,to para'is lawful.
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phrase the Code,the legislation might read; IDhe shipping
lines members of a conference are entitled to institute and
maintain loyalty arrangements with shippers based on the
contract system.”
In practices nowaday,relatively few conferences ope
rate loyalty systems.lt is resulted from the emergence of
strong outsiders that make loyalty arrangements ineffeotive.Those outsiders provided regular and reliable ser
vices with lower freight rates which means immediate discount
without entering

contracts.Anyway it might be that conferen

ces attempt to reinstitute

loyalty systems,Conferences,

if denied the right to use loyalty systems, would be
left powerless,Thus,it seems appropriate that conferences
should retain the power to establish loyalty systems,but
to orovide that " the form and terms

are matters for

consultation between the conference and shippers' organi
zation or representatives of shippers and appropriate
authorities” (see /Article 7 (l).
Article 8 headed"Dispensation”
Dispensation has always been a thorny problem and
will continue to be.The Code requires that conferences
shall examine and give a decision quickly the request
by dispensation,And if the dispensation is withheld, the
conference shall give reason^ in writtigg,Clearly,what is
quickly for the shioowner may not be quick enough for
the shipper.At the same time,shippers cannot expect under
standing from the conference if their own request is

frivolous- or dubious;it is alleged that shippers sometimes
hold back shipments so that they miss a conference sailing
and then ask for dispensation to ship en an advertised
non-conference vessel.
Article 11 dealt with Gonsultation Machinery,
It institutionalizes the machinery of consultations
and leaves no escape to either conferences or shippers
as it makes it mandatory or compulsory when it states:
” there shall be consultations on matters of com
mon interest' between a conference, shippers^*or-ganizations,representatives of shippers...,,
these consultations shall take place whenever re
quested by any of the above-mentioned parties",
and that:
" consultations shall be held before final decisions
are taken",
and farther:
" appropriate authorities shall have the right,
upon request,to participate fully in the consul
tations,but this does not mean that they play a
decision-making role".
Article 11(2 ) lists matters that may be the subject
of consultation:
a) - Changes in general tariff conditions and related
regulations;
b) - Changes in the general level of tariff rates and rates
for major commodities;
c) - Promotional and/or special freight rates;
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d) - Imposition of,and related changes in,surcharges;
e) - Loyalty arrangements,their establishment or changes
in their form and general conditions;
f) - Changes in the tariff classification of ports;
g) - Procedure for the supply of necessary infdrmation
by shippers concerning the expected volume and
nature of their cargoes;and
h) - Presentation of cargo for shipment and the requirements
regarding notice of cargo availability,
qr
Article 11(3) says that " to the extent that they
fall within the scope of activities of a conference,the
following matters may also be the subject of consultation:a) “ Operation of cargo inspection services;
b) - Changes in the pattern of services;
c) - Effects of the introduction of new technology in the
carriage of cargo,in particular unitization,with con
sequent reduction of conventional service or loss of
direct services;and
d) - Adequacy and quality of shipping services,including
the impact of pooling berthing or sailing arrangements
on the availability of shipping services and freight
rates at which shipoing services are provided;changes
in the areas served and in the regularity of calls by
conference vessels.
The two last items

c) and d) are particularly

important and relevant to many developing countries^
trades where such trades are served as by -products of
other trades.

A case comes to mind here is the containerazition
of conference services in such trades which both left a
number of shippers dissatisfied because on account of the
very nature of their cargoes they, would still have to
rely on conventional services,and increased.the overall
cost of transportation of the cargoes which lend them
selves to containerization.
One problem within consultations is the big shippers
and the small shippers may have widely different point of
*'€

view on some issues.This may arise from genuinely diffe
rent interests which need to be taken into account -for
example,small shippers generally fill the need for much _
greater service frequency than large shippers,But the dif
ferent points of view may arise from ignorance and the
fact that the small shippers are generally less well in
formed than the large shippers and are likely to have a
shorter time horizon,Then the point cannot be ignored

n.’

that large shippers are frequently able to make their
own arrangements with the shipping lines and the con
ferences and then may be perfectly willing to stand
aside and allow the conference to reomup'. from the small
shippers what it has given away to large shippers.
Even though this article attempts to protect ship
pers through requiring a consultative machinery before
decision are made,it is not without problems or weaknesses
which must be dealt with when putting the Code into ope
ration,particularly-in developing countries,Since effective
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consultations are not possible unless all parties are
equally informed,and given the fact that shippers^ c o u r -»^
cils in develooing countries,if existing at all,generally
lack the necessajr.y financial resources and manpower sup
port to effectively orepare themselves for negotiations
with conferences,
e). Provision and r'lachinery for Settlement of Disputes,
Part 2 Chapter

Ml

of the Code devotes for "provi-

tions and machinery for settlement of disputes".The Cg,de
provide for the settlement of disputes that may arise
out the implementation of the Code through a process of
international mandatory conciliation,The principles'and
procedures to be observed in this regard are spelled out
in 23 articles,from Article 23 to Article 45,
In normal English usage,conciliation is a process
by which a third party attempts to bring the disputants
to agreement,The conciliator does not make an award or a
r e^comindation, In- a successful conciliation the role of
the conciliator is normally invisible,In arbitration,on
the other hand,the arbitrators,after listening to both
sides in a dispute and collecting and weighting such
further evidence as they see fit,which would usually inclu
ded evidence concerning the practices of the trade,pro
duce a ruling,In advance of the arbitration proceedings
both parties agree that,having accented to go to arbitra
tion and on the identity of the arbitrator or of the arbi
tration panel,they will accept the award.
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International mandatory conciliation is neither of
these things. It is like arbitration in that a decision is
given; it is like conciliation in that there is no prior
commitment to acceptance. The parties agree on the aopointment of the conciliator or of the panel of conciliators, a
recommendation is mdde and then the parties either accept
it or reject it. Thus, not only is a new concept in juris
prudence introdaced, but a new meaning is given to a wellestablished word referring to a well-established practice.
The process provided in the Code for the settlement
of a dispute on a major question is consultation,normal
conciliation, international mandatory conciliation. ’’The
parties to a dispute shall first attempt to settle it by
an exchange of views or direct negotiations..,"(see Article
23 (3 )); clearly,consultation

is included in the exchange

of views or direct negotiations",but the provision is pro
perly wider. In fact the Code provisions encourage recourse
to all possible avenues of settlement before embarking on
international mandatory conciliation,which is to be seen
as a last resort.
At first,let's look at the parties whose disputes
fall into the scope of the application. The Code's dis
pute settlement machinery applies to disputes between:
a) A conference and a shipping line;
b) Shipping lines which are members of a conference;
c) A conference or a shipping line which is a member
thereof,and a shippers'organization or shippers,and

d) Two or more conferences;
and the matters regarding which disputes could be re— fered to international mandatory conciliation are:
1

: refusal of admission of a national shipping line to
a conference serving the foreign trade of the country
of that shipping line;

2:

refusal of admission of a third country shipping line
to a conference;

3:

expulsion from a conference;

A: inconsistency of a conference agreement with the Code;
5:

a general freight rate increase;

6:

surcharges;

7

: changes in freight rates or the composition of a cur
rency adjustment factor due to exchange rate changes;

8

: participation in trade;

9

: the form and terms of proposed loyalty agreements.
The principle of the Code ^s international mandatory

conciliation :
1,

International mandatory conciliation,under the Code,is
applicable principally to dispute between parties belong
ing to different nationalities. Parties of the same na
tionality are expected to settle their differences through
recourse to national law,unless this creates serious
difficulties in the fulfilment of the provisions of the
Code.

2.

The basic feature of the Codes^dispute settlement regime
is that it is a system of mandatory conciliation and not
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one of arbitration,the purpose of conciliation being
to reach an amicable settlement of the dispute through
recommendations formulated by independent conciliators.
Conciliators are to be drawn from an international panel
of experts,each contracting party having the right to
•
3.

nominate a total of 12 persons to the panel.
Article 25 provides that where conciliation proceedings
has been initiated such proceedings shall have prece
dence over national law. However,recommendations of con
ciliators are not binding in that any party to a 'Sispute
has the right,by giving reasons, to accept or reject a
recommendation made by conciliators. The party refusing
to accept a recommendation would then be free to seek
redress by other means including access to national law
as appropriate.

4.

Where parties to a dispute have accepted a recommendation
by conciliators,the Contracting Parties concerned are
expected to enforce such recommendations except where
a court or other competent authority of the country
where enforcement is sought found that:
- any party which accepted the recommendation was
under some legal incapacity at the time of acceptance;
- fraud or coercion has been used in the making of
the recommendation;
- the recommendation is contrary to public policy
in the country of enforcement,or
- the composition of the conciliators,or conciliation

procedure,was not in accordance with the provisions of
the Code,
5.

The Code also provides for parties to a dispute to re
solve such a dispute through mutually agreed procedures
other than the Codes^international mandatory concilia
tion procedure. The use of such alternative means of
solving disputes is not permitted in the case of dis
putes relating to freight rate increases,surcharges and
currency adjustment factors if national legislation rules
or regulations prevent shippers from having this free
dom of choice.
The major weakness of the conciliation system set

out in the Code is the ability of either party to reject
its results if they wish to do so, and the absence of any
effective sanction against the party which does so reject
the recommendation. This new concept has never been function
ing.And, it is believed that it will never be allowed to
come into effect, because the EEC regulationexcludes use of
the procedures of IflC in trades between members states and
bther OECD countries. Limited'

the. use of the system

results in ineffectiveness. Additionally, most of the limited
trade is with developed countries, members of the OECD,
Will conference members which have rejected the system in
one part of their operations be willing to accept it in
other trades?

Government

in the

application

of the

Code

In chapter I of the Code, a definition of an "appro
priate authority" is given. The Code definition of an appro
priate authority is : "Either a government or a body desig
nated by a government or by a national legislation to per
form any of the functions ascribed to such authority by the
provisions of this Code." Or to put it more simply, an appro
priate authority is a body designated to do those things
under the Code which the Code says it can or should do. Thus
the definition says nothing about the status of such a body,
nor of its precise relation to the government which desig
nated it.
What can Appropriate authorities do? The preamble to
the Code contains three basis principles, of which one is
the principle that conferences should hold "meaningful" con
sultations, in which appropriate authorities could partici
pate upon request.
Certain attributes of appropriate authoritise are found
in the definitions contained in chapter I. According to these
definitions, an appropriate authority could:
- recognise a national shipping line ; and
- recoghisBjif it so desires, a shippersSrganization.
Turning to the body of the Code we find the following
provisions concerning the role of appropriate authorities,
namely:
- appropriate authorities can request that their views
on the admission of a new member to a conference be taken
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into accountj(Article l(5))
- approoriate authorities of the countries at both
ends of the trade may, if they so wish, take up the matters
of a disagreement between their groups of national ship
ping lines on the question of pooling and make their views
knoun;( Article 2(l4)), however, that one appropriate autho
rity cannot act on its own in such a matter;
- conferences shall provide machinery for reporting,
on request, to appropriate authorities on action taken in
connection with malpractices,etc ;( Articl e 5(l)>(c))
“ conferences shall make available to approoriate autho
rities, on request, copies of the conference agreements and
other related documents

Article B)

- appropiate authorities "Shall have the right, upon
request, to participate fully in consultations, but this does
not mean they play a decision-making role."(Article 11 (l));
and
*” appropriate authorities have the right to request
information and notice of intended action by conferences;
(Article 10; 14(l); 15(4); 19(2))
Article 14 seems to provide,by non-exclusion, that
appropriate authorities may request consultations in con
nection with a general freight rate increase and may request
the submission of a report from indeoendent accountants.
In the Article 14(2) say "at the request of any of the
parties prescribed for this -purpose in this Code...consul
tations shall commence..." The interpretation that appropri-
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ate authorities, not being specificlly excluded, are included
among the bodies entitled to demand consultation is debat
able.
In Article IB concerning surcharges and Article 17
concerning currency changes, it is ’’parties directly affected”
ujho are to be notified of any intened action and uho can
participate in consultations, which seems by implication
not to include aporopriate authorities. However, since
these are matters which may, according to Article 11, be the
subject of consultations, it seems that appropriate authori
ties must be notified, if they so wish, and may, also if
they so wish, participate in the consultations.
The Code and technology changes
When the Code was drafted in 1973-197A liner confer
ences were in a more dominant position than they are today.
Liner Conferences were viewed by developing countries at
that time of powerful cartels which were capable of dicta
ting the terms of cargo carriage.At the same time they were
able to restrain the possible growth of local national fleets
thruogh control over conference m,errbership, the use of loyal
ty agreements with shippers, and through their existing .
strength experience, and trade netiaork.*
Much has changed since 1973-1974. Strong, well-financed
non-conference,lines have emerged and taken a substantial
amount of cargo away from conference lines. In1974, times
were such that in most 1iner-traffics th©.conferences covered
roughly 90 percent of the trade,whilst today outsider par
ticipation of between

20%

to 50^ in quite a number of trades

is

often

the

case

With in these ID years, the oil price has exploded
and world economy has to face one of the worst recessions
ever experienced. World recession has reduced wotld trade
and the demand for shipping services so that liner shipping,
though to a lesser extent than is the case with bulk shipping,
is marked by significant over-capacity of tonnage. This
situation of excess supply of tonnage together with a fun
damental structural change in liner shipping,the so-called
container revolution,had weakened conference position.
Containerization has changed the face of liner ship
ping, introducing new, highly-productive.ships in the decline
in growth of world trade worsened thesituation ,oif .the exces
sive supply.
Liner shipping is now increasinglysseen by many as
a part of the world-wide,integrated, intermodal system of
transportation moving goods from door to door rather than
as a discrete

activity moving goods from port to port.

Containerized shipping operations, however,are capi
tal intensive. In these circumstances,many liner operators
are constantly seeking to rationalize their services via
cosortia, coordinated sailings, space charter agreements,
•joint services ect» This arises some problems regarding
the Codes application.The Code never mentioned of 'con
sortium' It is a new type of combination which is considered
as a single carrier and, in the Code terms is not a group
of vessel-operating carriers. Itcan be a member of the

a
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conference as it can trade as an independent line which
represents a real threat to conferences
And due to its high fixed costs, financial success
of containerized shipping operations depends upon high load
factors and quick turn around time. One of the consequences
of containerized shipping is the emergence of the concept
of load center ports. From the stand point of economy of
Qoeration, large container vessels should operate only bet
ween such load centers rather than calling at several ports
at each end of a trade.
Another aspect of containerized shipping which may
impact Code imolementation is reflected in the growing com
petition among ports for cargoes. While ports have always
competed to some extent, by virtue of geographic propinquity
and limited alternative transportation possibilities from
inland areas ports could rely on cargo being provided from
their national'hinterlands^

With containerization all ibis

is changing; hinterlands of different ports increasingly
are overlapping, due to the shippers ability to move his
goods via a variety of ports, evenon different coasts.
Land-bridge and mini-bridge service is a reality today.
Non-conference shipping lines and fair competition on
a commercial basis:
In the Code text, there are no provision dealing with
•^■non conference line^except for Article 18 dealing with fight
ing ships, the use of which is prohibited. UNCTAD regarded
fighting ships as an anticompetitive device which almost
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invariably led to the disruption of the trade. In addition
to the Code article there is a resolution on non-conference
shipping lines annexed to the Code, This picks up some of
the provisions which had been proposed for inclusion in the
Code and is protective of the position of non-conference
lines. The Code always uses the term 'non-conference I'ineC
It never utilize the word 'outsider^ There is a difference
between a non-conference line and an outsider. The term
'outsider'embraces all types of competitors to the confer^n

ence such as tramps, specialized carriers and include non
conference line, where as the term 'non-conference line'
covers only the offer of regular service on a similar basis
to those offered by the conference, 'Outsider'is also used
to refer to a line, member of a conference, whose ships are
rarely fully loaded on one or other leg of their normal vo
yages, calling at ports which are served by another confer
ence with the purpose of taking cargo. The outsider offer a
regular service, but without any guarantee of continuity.
The resolution on non-conference shipping lines offers them
protection only if they observe the principles of fair compe
tition, The principles are easy to mention in broad terms,
but difficult to define, ivir, Sturmey has shown his opinion
that it is easier to give examples of what is not fair compe
tition than of what is fair competition, and that a line mem
ber of a conference are operating under a number of constraints,
as:

- the need to make a sufficient profit in the long run

to motivate the owners to maintain and replace their ships

in order to assure the continuity of the service;
- the need to maintain an administrative structure at
the conference level.
- a common carrier obligation to take what cargo is
offered and not to reject low-rated cargo, for example;
- the duty to provide a regular service in good times
and in bad; and
- the need to conform to Code rules on a wide variety
of issues, including giving notice of the intention to increase rates or imoose surcharges, to hold consultations,
to furnish information and reports etc.
And his further opinion of what., are the cases of unfair ..
competition as follows:
- Ships which had carried cargoes of cement to lagos
a few years back had earned enormous demurrage while lying
at anchor for ten months or so; many then tried to lift
cargoes from Abidjan at cut rates. Such ships were obviously
not thinking of long term sevice and so were offering un
fair competition.
- A ship which calls at ports only for high rated car
goes and ignores-all the rest is not assuming common carrier
obligations.
- A well established liner company, members of a con
ference , which poaches on the territory of another confer
ence lis not thinking of providing a regular service to the
trade,nor thinking of long term costs,

ect.
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THE CURREWT SITUATION OF SHIPPING INDUSTRY IN THAILAND
International trade plays a very important part in
Thai econemy. Exports and imports both in terms of volume
and value are increasing. The main

imports are chemicals^. ,

machinery,iron ore, vehicles etc. The main exports are
agricultural products,rubber

&

synthetic,electric machinery.

The volume of trade both inward and outward by sea has in
creased from 20 mt, in 197A to 32 mt.in 1981 which repre
sented 60

%

increase.

Inspite of the importance of international seaborne
trade of Thailand,the size of national fleets is very
small. In 197A,only 3,59

%

of the total volume of trade was

carried by national fleets. The participation of national
fleets in carrying national cargo has slowly increasedto
7,12^ in 1981,8 years since then.
In 1978 Government issued the ('Mercantile ('Marine Pro
motion Commission Act 1978 with the purpose to support na
tional shipping activities such as seatransportation,marine
insurance,shipbuilding and repairing and ports. To carry
out th'ese tas(<s,the Commission and its secretariat' office
have been formed. Since then Government has already carried
out several policy measures trying to expand national mer
chant fleets. In addition to

man power development,..giving

ineentive to foreign investment and encouraging Thai shipping

d
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companies to open new routes i.e. Thailand-America and Aus
tralia, u/e have laid down a plan to give supports to national
ships by following measurements; (some measures have not
been putinto effect).
Cargo Reservation
1, not less than

^0%

of Governments export cargoes will be

asked to be transported by Thai ships during sales nego
tiation and this will also be applied to individuals^
exports when selling in CIF terms but must not obstrojct the
trade.
2, All import cargo that belong tbaGovernment, state enterprisesand government loan cargoes shall be transported by
Thai ships.
Tax incentive
Give tax privilege to Thai shipping companies'sharehold
ers and those who use Thai ships.
I^onetary measures
1, Founding merchant marine funds
2. Giving financial assistance in the form of packing credit.
In 1980 the number of Thai registered ships was 108,
total capacity was 557,8^1 dwt. That number has increased
to 149 ships with capacity 678,577 DWT. in 1983. The DWT.
increased 22^, When compacing with Thai neighbouring coun
tries, it is found that , in 1;980 the Philippines has general
cargo ships totally 1,192 n.DWT, Indonesia and Flalaysia have
merchant fleets 1.086 M.and 1,0 n.DWT. respectively.

Table 1 No.DWT. classified by ship's type in 1980
and 1983

Year

DWT

No .

Tanker

Dry Cargo

Total

No.

DliiT

DWT.

No,

1980

106

557,6A1

56

328,4A2

50

229,199

1983

1A9

678,577

87

435,341

62

243,236

Source: Office of I'lercantile Marine Promotion Commission
«C

Most of Thai ships are small and old. Most of them
are conventional type. In 1980 the average capacity of Thai
ships is 5,261 DU/T,the average capacity of dry cargo ships
is 5,865 OUT, In 1982,it was found that in 83 examples the
percentage of ships that were in bad condition

was 62.7

(more than 16 years old. )of these moderate was 32,5 (between
6 - 1 5 years old) and those in good condition was 4.8(less
than 6 years). Having most of the ship being in bad condi
tion results in
1. the high cost of maintenance
2. having low speed,staying relatively longstime in dry
dock result in low earning time of the ships.
3. more difficult to get cargoes. Shippers have to pay
more insurance premium for their cargoes.
Most of Thai ships are conventional type . There are
only 5 small LNG carriers. Almost all tankers are product
carriers, Thailand at the present time do not have a

container vessel but a feu container feeders,
Paticipation of Thai ships in carrying national cargo
In 1974 Thai seaborne trade volume carried by Thai
vessels is only 3.61^. The percentage has increased gradually
to 5.26^ in 1978 and 7,12 in 1981,
Problems and ocstacles
National fleets cannot develop and take very little
part in the transportation of Thai foreign trade due to
many factors:
1,

*1.

Lack of competitive condition: Shipping today is a ca
pital intensive industry as already mentioned. Competi
tive shipping companies have used very high advance
tecnology in many sections of operations and management,
ship operation, maintenance,fuel saving, information
netuorks. Comparing to Thai ships most of uhich are
small and old. And most of them are conventional type.
Conventional vessels are considered to-be inefficient ships
Their speeds are relatively slou, A container ship
is about tuo times faster than conventional ships,- And
at the same size a containership has 6 times more capa
city than a conventional ship. The next problem is Thai
shipping companies are too many but small , many ships.ping companies have only one ship to operate. This re
sults in high operating cost per ship. And lack of mar
keting and management skills.
The enforcement of international convention on safety
and pollution prevention limited the trading area of

109.

Thai ships.
2. Lack of funds: shipping today is high investment. To buy
or build new ships is expensive. And the returns are rela
tively small. Governments in many countries are providing
their national shipowners with long term loans and low
interest rates. In Thailand there is only one state-owned
financial company that offers loans for shipping with the
interest of 14.5?q, No private-owned commercial companies
are interested in this industry. Onemain reason is l^ck of
skilled people in this business.
3. Lack of skilled manpower in the field of shipping:
Statistics in 1977 shows that 2,037 people are employed
in 67 ships (both dry cargo carriers and tankers). Ofthe
2,037 people 859 people are foreigners or reoresented A3^.
Those needed are high level managers and operators. Most
of Thai master mariners came from the Navy.

CHAPTER VIII
LINER SHIPPING IN THAILAND AND STATUS OF PARTICIPATION OF
THAI NATIONAL FLAG VESSELS IN CONFERENCES
Dry cargo prospects
1976

1980

1985

General cargo

3.65

4.1

5.5

Bulk agricultural

0.06

0.1

Fertilizer's

0.25

0.5

0.7

Sub total

3.96

4.7

6.35

General cargo

0.3

0.4

1.0

Agricultural produce

9.8

10.9

12.3

1.5

2.0

3.2

Sub total

11.6

13. 3

16.5

TOTAL TRAFFIC

15.56

18.0

22.85

Dry cargo (min,tons)
Imports

0.15

,

Exports

POolasses,cement,ores
and sodaash plus rock salt

Containerisable general cargoes
Containerised cargoes in 1000 tons
1985

1980
Total
12A1

Imports

Exports

Total

696

5A5

2500

There are 5 outuiard
cargoes from Thailand

Imports
1400

Exports
1100

conferences carrying outward ,

1. Thailand/Bay of Bengal Rate Agreement
2. Thailand/Europe Conference
3. Thailand/Japan Conference
li,

Thailand/Pacific Freight Conference

5, Thailand/US Atlantic and Gulf Conference
There are as many as 20 inwards conferences carrying
inward' cargoes to Thailand either calling Thai port (Bang/
kok port) as direct port or base port. But most of those
conference,, vessels do not call Bangkok port directly^. They
call at Singapore and have their cargoes transhiped in
feeders to Bangkok port. Singapore serves as a centre port
for FAREAST and another reason is Bangkok port is a river
port. It is too small to recieve ocean containers.
The important inwards conferences are
1, Japan/Thailand Freight Conference
2, Far Eastern Freight Conference (East bound)
The participation of Thai ships in the Conferences*.
Four Thai shipping companies are members of both Thai
land/Japan Conference and Japan/Thailand Freight Conference
A Thai shipping company is a member of both Thailand/
Europe Conference and FEFC
We don't have any Thai shipping lines sailing to and
from the USA,Australia which are considered as Thai's big
trading partners
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(l) Japan - Thailand Conference (import)
cargoes carried by flag vessels
Unit Revenue Ton
Volume of cargo
Year

Japan flag

Third country

Thai flag

Total

1979

829,524

(51.l) 475,254

(29.l)

321,525 (19.8) 1,626,123

1980

769,965

(48.7) 499,087

(31.6)

310,549 (19.7) 1,579.601

1981

739,739

(47.l) 500,687

(31.8)

331,583 (21.1 ) 1,572,009

(2 ) Thailand - Japan Conference (export)
Unit Revenue Ton
Volume of cargo
Year
1979

Japan flag

Thai flag

292,745 (27.0)

Third country

Total

460,014 (42.4)

332,882 (30 .6) 1,085,641

1980

76,093 (1 2 .2 )

285,674 (45.9)

260,320 (41 .9)

622,087

1981

11 3,662 (1 6.5)

294,556 (42,7)

280,954 (40 .8)

689,172

1982

21 8,969 (31.7)

253,787 (36.7)

217,862 (31 .5)

690,618

(3 ) Outside lind (export to Japan)
OUTSIDE LINE
CARGO

nOLASSES

TOTAL

Year
sailing volume

sailing

volume

sailing

volume

1979

220

702,552

54

319,655

284

1 ,022,207

1980

198

406,470

30

149,542

228

555,012

1981

180

229,896

30

141,829

210

371,725

1982

216

620,889

73

387,592

289

1, 008,481

From those tables showing cargoes carried in ThailandJapan route, we can see that Thai vessels carried inward
cargoes amounting to around 30^. of cargo carried by confe
rences and outward cargoes amounting to around

Table

no,3 shows that outside lines carried a substantial part
of Thailand - Japan trade.
Those statistics are a bit old. But it is said that
at the time being Thai vessels carry. J more or less

of

the cargoes carried by conferences and outsiders carry 40

%

of the total trade. This situation is somewhat similar to
the Thoiland-Europe trade. These statistics donot show the
revenue earned by Thai ships. However, due to the fact that
Th$x ships are of conventional type, it is believed that
they carry

. relatively low valued cargoes which generated

low freight rates.

CHAPTER IX
SUGGESTION ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CODE IN THAILAND
The Code should be implemented in the way that it be
taken as a philosophy that aimed to promote national ship
ping industry and national overseas trade. It should not
be looked at as a set of rigid rules that bind all the
parties concerned resulting in the restriction of the free
flow of trade.
The following are the roles that should be maintained
by the Government:
- -to facilitate the conditions that bring stability and
efficiency to the sea transportation services,
- to maintain the balance in the power between the seatransport suppliers and seatransport users,
- to support and assist in building up of a modern national
shipping industry and other related infrastructure,
- to keep trace of the developments of new technology
and new concepts which will bring changes to the shipping
industry and to be able to take immediate actions whenever
it was found that the changes will bring detriment to the
national interests and securities.
In the present situation of wold shipping, there
is excessive supply of shipping services. This causes an
unfettered competition among shipowners. This situation
may result in the low utilization of vessels in many trades,
(

In liner sector this will cause high cost per ton in the

ships operation and cause higher freight rates than other
wise when the whole space of the ship is utilized. One
solution can be that the Government find a proper way to
limit, in each particular trade, the number of carriers that
can meet the demand for seatransport and can provide services
according to the requirement of the trade. The Code attributes
to the concept of having a limited number of carriers as
it is in favour of "closed conference". Under a certain ■'
number of carriers, carriers can cooperate better than where
the number is uncertain,

«

The Governments policy should encourage those non
conference carriers to enter conferences,.In this way, they
can coordinate and rationalize their services.
The Governments policy should strengthen the conference
system by eliminating the circumstance by which non-conference
lines gain benbfit over conference member lines. That is
to impose common carrier obligation to both of them equally
and put an end to the chances of non—conference lines to
pick up only high value goods with lower rates than those
of the conferences.
The Code gives a definition to "conference” but never
defines those new forms of combinations such as consortium,
joint service etc. These new organisations can be big and
powerful and be able to go alongside independently with
conferences. The Government should force them to enter into
the framework of conference. If consortia are free to operate
outside, it is not justified for conferences^members who are

being under certain number of obligations given by the Code,
The Government should encourage Conferences to use
loyalty arrangements as fighting tools against different
kinds of outsiders.
The Government should encourage the use of pooling
agreement fo.r making the best use of full rationalization.
The Government might support conferences by facili
tating the operation of the conferences^vessels or giving
A.

them some privileges for example.
US

Policy to promote national fleets
In the present situation of overtonnaging, the Go
vernment should encourage Thai shipowners to replace the
old conventional type vessels with fairly new container
vessels the type,size and speed of which should be opti
mum to the particular trade.
The Government should encourage the mergeiCcof
small shipping companies into -larger concerns°‘^ which
Government might put the requirement that the new coinpanies
be public companies before accepting as National Shipping
lines.
The Government should encourage the opening of new
routes for national ships in the trade the volume of which
is substantial enough to run a regular service. In the trade
the volume of which is small,the solution might be the use
of space chartering.
The Government should support ’

joint venturesbet-

•ween National Shipping Companie^and advanced foreign companies

for the gains of technical know how, management and opera
tional skills.
The Government should induce direct calls by ocean
carriers to Thai ports. If it is not commercially viable
to do so, Government should initiate negotiations for Thai
shipowners to get a fair share in the carriage of national
seaborne trade in the regional level.
The Government should take initial steps to form an
organization of shippers which represents the interests of
every group of shippers, ff Freight consolidation center
or freight booking center should be established in the
organization.
The Government should induce Thai exporters to sell
in GIF term and importers to buy in FOB term and encourage
them to use the services of national shipping lines or any
lines which are members of conferences.
The Government should establish a freight study unit
and shipping data base for the use of development planning
and to strengthen the negotiation power of national shippers
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